

# Future Military Coalitions

## The Transatlantic Challenge

### Report of a French–German–UK–U.S. Working Group

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The views expressed in this report reflect the deliberations of the members of a multinational working group, and are not necessarily those of their organizations or of any government. While the report represents a consensus view of the working group, individual members do not necessarily subscribe to every statement contained therein.

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## List of Acronyms

<b>AAR</b>	Air to Air Refueling
<b>ARM</b>	Antiradiation/Anti Radar Missile
<b>AWACS</b>	Airborne Warning and Control Systems
<b>BDA</b>	Battle Damage Assessment
<b>C<sup>2</sup></b>	Command and Control
<b>C<sup>3</sup></b>	Command, Control and Communications
<b>C<sup>3</sup>R</b>	Commandement, communication, conduite et renseignement (FR) – see C <sup>4</sup> ISR
<b>C<sup>4</sup></b>	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
<b>C<sup>4</sup>ISR</b>	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<b>CAP</b>	Combat Air Patrol
<b>CDE</b>	Concept Development and Experimentation
<b>CESDP</b>	Common European Security and Defence Policy (EU)
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civil-Military Cooperation
<b>CINC</b>	Commander In Chief
<b>CINCNAVEUR</b>	Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<b>CINCSOUTH</b>	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
<b>CJTF</b>	Combined Joint Task Force (NATO)
<b>COP</b>	Common Operational Picture
<b>COPS</b>	Comité politique de sécurité (EU) – see PSC
<b>CPCO</b>	Centre de préparation et de conduite des opérations (FR) <sup>1</sup>
<b>CSAR</b>	Combat Search and Rescue
<b>DCI</b>	Defense Capabilities Initiative (NATO)
<b>DEAD</b>	Destruction of Enemy Air Defense
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense (U.S.)
<b>DSACEUR</b>	Deputy, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
<b>ECAP</b>	European Capability Action Plan (EU)
<b>ESDI</b>	European Security and Defense Identity (NATO)
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy (EU)
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUCOM</b>	European Command (U.S.)
<b>GPS</b>	Global Positioning System
<b>HARM</b>	High Speed Antiradiation Missile
<b>HIMAD</b>	High to Medium Altitude Air Defense
<b>HUMINT</b>	Human (source of) Intelligence
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IFOR</b>	Implementation Force (NATO, Bosnia)
<b>ISR</b>	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
<b>ISTAR</b>	Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, and Reconnaissance
<b>JCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.)

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<sup>1</sup>Strategic level headquarters.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<b>JDAM</b>	Joint Direct Attack Munition
<b>JFCOM</b>	Joint Forces Command (U.S.)
<b>MEU</b>	Marine Expeditionary Unit (U.S.)
<b>MIC</b>	Multinational Interoperability Council
<b>MLRS</b>	Multiple-Launch Rocket System
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBC</b>	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>OTAN</b>	Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord – see NATO
<b>PAC</b>	Patriot Advanced Capability
<b>PESD</b>	Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense – see CESDP
<b>PGM</b>	Precision Guided Munition
<b>PJHQ</b>	Permanent Joint Headquarters (UK)
<b>PSC</b>	Political and Security Committee (EU)
<b>PSYOPS</b>	Psychological Operations
<b>QDR</b>	Quadrennial Defense Review (U.S.)
<b>RMA</b>	Revolution in Military Affairs
<b>ROE</b>	Rules of Engagement
<b>SACEUR</b>	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
<b>SACLANT</b>	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)
<b>SAR</b>	Search And Rescue
<b>SDR</b>	Strategic Defence Review (UK)
<b>SEAD</b>	Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
<b>SF</b>	Special Forces
<b>SFOR</b>	Stabilization Force (NATO, Bosnia)
<b>SHAPE</b>	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
<b>SHORAD</b>	Short-Range Air Defense

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

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<b>SIGINT</b>	Signals Intelligence
<b>SG/HR</b>	Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP (EU)
<b>SOF</b>	Special Operations Forces
<b>TBMD</b>	Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense
<b>TMD</b>	Theater Missile Defense
<b>UAV</b>	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
<b>UE</b>	Union Européenne – see EU
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	United Nations Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
<b>WEU</b>	Western European Union

# INTRODUCTION

## PROJECT RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

Transatlantic coalition operations have become increasingly vital to meeting the challenges of the evolving global security environment. The terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> sharply underscored the critical importance of “winning the peace” when intervening militarily in crisis situations, as festering instabilities and failed states can give rise to acute terrorist and other asymmetric threats.

Moreover, coalition operations in Afghanistan and the debate over regime change in Iraq have sharply highlighted the fundamental importance as well as the huge problems involved in “winning the peace” when undertaking military interventions in countries with very difficult political, economic, ethnic and social conditions. Winning the peace entails creating the conditions that will allow for a withdrawal of the intervention force without risking renewed destabilization and violence. This requirement can often lead to very lengthy military deployments.

These observations underline the critical importance for NATO and EU nations to form coalitions in order to carry out military interventions. Yet, the construct and conduct of coalition military operations is a complex and challenging business in both political and military terms. While the term coalition implies a group of states that chooses to act in concert with one another in order to achieve a specified goal, it does not necessarily entail agreement among coalition members on the best means of achieving that goal. Achieving the level of military “cooperability”<sup>1</sup> needed for countries to operate effectively together is a painstaking task. Further complicating this picture is the confusion and no small measure of incoherence that exists between NATO’s traditional role as an Alliance with an extremely robust military structure designed to counter a fixed, existential threat, and its still emerging one as a “provider of services” to facilitate ad hoc coalitions able to intervene in a wide range of crisis scenarios.

## INTRODUCTION

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All of these issues – the challenges of constructing and conducting coalition operations, their importance to the achievement of national security objectives, and the uncertainties surrounding NATO’s role – have been at play in the coalition intervention in Afghanistan. Washington chose to run the initial stages of the Afghanistan campaign largely on its own, except for the involvement of British forces and a modicum of support from other allies. In a campaign dominated at that point by local proxy forces, special operations forces, and highly sophisticated air delivery of precision guided munitions, integrating allied militaries into the operation seemed more of a complication than a benefit, while U.S. perceptions that European political involvement in the NATO campaign in Kosovo had been overly intrusive further motivated Washington to act largely on a unilateral basis. However, following the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the militaries of other NATO countries became extensively involved in Afghanistan as the need to hunt for dispersed Taliban and Al Qaeda forces as well as to maintain security in Kabul required significant numbers of “boots on the ground.” Despite this extensive allied involvement, NATO as an institution remained on the sidelines of the campaign, leading many in the transatlantic security community to proclaim that the organization was “dead.”

The development of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) is now adding another potential operational framework and set of politico-military issues to the existing complexities of U.S.-European military operations. The decision by EU member states to establish CESDP stemmed from the strongly held perception that European countries needed to undertake certain military operations on their own when NATO as a whole did not wish to become engaged as well as to develop the capabilities to make a more effective contribution to U.S.-led operations. A major premise behind this project was that these two core CESDP objectives basically reinforce each other, but that they could nonetheless contain certain areas of tension requiring identification, analysis, and recommendations for resolution.

The emergence of CESDP has given rise to three potential forms of U.S.-European coalitions: U.S. or NATO-led, EU-led with support from U.S. and NATO assets, and EU-autonomous. The question of how these three coalition constructions might differ in terms of capabilities, organization and conduct of operations in responding to

the same crisis was a major one for the project, as was the impact of these differences on the ability of states to operate effectively across the range of potential coalition responses. The project sought as well to conduct a realistic appraisal of European intervention capabilities, looking at whether the development of autonomous capabilities will help bring more and better military resources to bear on future crises, whether the goal of developing EU-led operations will strengthen or distort military spending decisions in participating states, and the extent to which a more focused set of European equipment priorities can be established.

In sum, this project's central issue was to examine how European efforts to enhance defense capabilities, particularly through CESDP, will affect the ability of NATO and EU nations to form and conduct effective coalition military operations. The project sought to identify potential political and military issues surrounding Euro-Atlantic coalition military operations, and to develop recommendations for both Western countries and multinational security organizations concerning defense policy, organization, concept and doctrine development, equipment, and political relationships.

## METHODOLOGY

A multinational working group reflecting a broad spectrum of expertise and opinion from France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. carried out this project. The U.S. Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology (U.S.-CREST) formulated and initiated the project. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) in France served as co-organizing bodies, while the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) took part in a secondary role.<sup>2</sup> The defense ministries in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), all agreed to participate in the study in an advisory capacity. The bulk of the project working group consisted of civilian and military officials from the three European defense ministries and the U.S. DoD, together with representatives from each of the research institutes.

In a series of meetings held between November 2001 and June 2002, the working group developed and used illustrative crisis scenarios to explore how CESDP could affect the operational concepts, force

## INTRODUCTION

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composition, and military capabilities of future transatlantic and EU coalition operations. The group examined Balkan type peace enforcement, Middle East regional conflict, and Horn of Africa humanitarian intervention scenarios through the prism of the three coalition constructions noted above: NATO/U.S.-led, EU-led with NATO/U.S. support, and EU autonomous. It did so in two periods, 2005 and 2015, with the first one establishing a baseline for coalition and opposing forces capabilities, and the second assuming a substantial progression of CESDP.

The working group divided into three subgroups, each representing a coalition construction. The subgroups established coalition political objectives, military tasks, command and force structure, information, communications and weapons systems, and operational concepts. The subgroups then conducted “interactive assessments” of how their defined coalition approaches and associated capabilities would deal with the crisis scenarios, taking into account the capabilities and potential reactions of opposing forces. Examination of U.S.-European cooperability issues also constituted an important aspect of the interactive assessments. The working group did not intend, and did not have the necessary resources, to conduct a detailed operational planning and wargaming exercise.

The working group’s assessments of the coalition interventions together with advice from the participating defense officials largely shaped the contents of this report, which does not necessarily represent official views. The report begins with a stage-setting chapter on the political and military context that surrounds the formation of U.S.-European military coalitions. Chapter two provides an analytic summary of the results of the interactive assessments of the coalition interventions. The third chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the results of the interactive assessments, while chapter four contains the project recommendations. Appendix A describes in more detail the project’s methodological approach, Appendix B the crisis situations considered, and Appendix C the full results of the subgroup interactive assessments. Copies of this report in Acrobat (pdf) format may also be downloaded from the U.S.-CREST website at <http://www.uscrest.org/CESDP.htm>.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The working group would like to thank a number of individuals who made a particular contribution to its work. Jean-François Delpéch chaired working group plenary sessions, while Joe Eash, Christian Delanghe and William Hopkinson chaired the project subgroups. Michael Codner, Robert Grant, Dominique Orsini, and Stanley Sloan acted as rapporteurs for subgroup and plenary sessions.<sup>3</sup> Robert Grant was principal author and editor of the project report, with Michael Codner, William Hopkinson, Joe Luquire, Dominique Orsini, and Stanley Sloan contributing various sections. Robert Grant and Dominique Orsini assured the overall management of the project. The working group would also like to thank the European MoD and U.S. DoD officials who gave briefings on issues related to the project topic.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>The term cooperability comes from a previous multinational working group project report, *Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead through Cooperability*. Cooperability refers to the different elements that determine the ability of coalition members to work effectively together, and thus includes the successful bridging of differences in doctrine, organization, concepts of operation, and culture, in addition to technical interoperability; see Appendix D, page 105.

<sup>2</sup>For a brief description of the four institutes, see page 107.

<sup>3</sup>Short biostatements of the project principals begin on page 109.



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Transatlantic coalition operations, despite their difficulties, have become increasingly vital to meeting the challenges of the evolving global security environment. This project examined how the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) could affect the ability of NATO and European Union (EU) nations to form and conduct effective coalition military operations. To perform this examination, U.S.-CREST convened a multinational working group reflecting a broad spectrum of expertise and opinion from France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.<sup>1</sup> The working group explored how CESDP could affect the operational concepts, force composition, and military capabilities of future transatlantic coalitions in 2005 and 2015 through illustrative crisis scenarios.

## CONCLUSIONS

### **CESDP, NATO and Transatlantic Cooperability<sup>2</sup>**

- CESDP could help narrow existing operational gaps between U.S. and European forces because its capabilities generation process is being driven in part by the realization that European countries need significant military assets to conduct the kinds of military operations foreseen by the EU.
- Some European nations also aspire to maintain high intensity combat capability, including the ability to undertake certain combat operations on a national basis as well as to integrate into a coalition framework in cases of larger scale conflict.
- European militaries are gradually shifting their acquisition priorities to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR) integration, long-range precision strike, rapidly deployable joint forces, and unmanned vehicles. For example, in a 2005 time frame, European countries will have begun to deploy significant new stand-off precision strike assets.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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- Due to varied force employment philosophies, culture, and capabilities, autonomous European military interventions will be based on different concepts of operations than those used by the United States; with proper attention on both sides of the Atlantic these concepts should be compatible and capable of harmonization.
- U.S.-European C<sup>4</sup>ISR interoperability will be critical to European ability to exploit support from U.S. assets as well as to U.S.-European ability to operate effectively together. It will also allow the U.S. to exploit in a timely way complementary information from European sources and assets. The ability to establish and maintain a common operational picture among all coalition partners is a vital objective.
- There is a strong need for greater intelligence sharing at the operational and strategic levels, between the U.S. and European countries as well as within Europe, and for the development of common procedures to do so.
- A “division of labor” approach to coalition operations, in which the U.S. conducts combat operations and the Europeans assume peace support responsibilities, constitutes a flawed and counterproductive operational solution to the failure to address the connectivity, standards, and doctrinal issues that contribute to transatlantic cooperability.

### **European Intervention Capabilities**

- By 2005, the EU, or a more limited coalition of the most militarily capable EU nations, will be able to carry out a range of autonomous operations from humanitarian intervention at considerable distance up to and including highly challenging peace enforcement operations by adapting mission objectives and operational concepts to available capabilities.
- However, political leaders may be reluctant to undertake certain military operations due to perceived operational difficulties that could arise from generally recognized 2005 capability shortfalls.

- If planned capability improvements are successfully implemented, European countries by 2015 should be able autonomously to conduct humanitarian support interventions at considerable distance, as well as highly challenging peace enforcement missions, at lower levels of political and military risk.
- With these improvements, it should then be possible for European countries to participate with substantial joint capabilities in a U.S.-led regional conflict intervention, in particular with a major share of the ground component, and as a result influence the intended outcome of the engagement.
- The implementation of all currently planned capability improvements will require additional European defense expenditures. However, with proper Europe-wide rationalization, it need not imply substantial budget increases.
- European countries would also greatly strengthen European and transatlantic coalition effectiveness by creating a European “spearhead force” of land, sea and air elements that could be used as the immediate reaction element of an EU operation as well as to fulfill NATO requirements and missions.

### Political and Military Interfaces

- The complexity of coalition operations and the increased decision-making difficulties NATO and the EU are both likely to encounter as they enlarge their memberships will require more effective arrangements facilitating multi-level, multi-actor politico-military consultations. Effective coalition politico-military decision-making is likely to rely increasingly on framework nation structures and political leadership from major contributing nations.

### Toward Transatlantic Cooperability

- Although the U.S. may be able to win wars without significant allied contributions, it is unlikely in many situations to be able to win the peace without military (and non-military) assistance from European allies, whether those situations develop within or outside Europe.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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- Even with likely enhancements to European military capabilities during the next decade, European-led operations will benefit from the option of calling for U.S. participation given the potential evolution of opposing forces' capabilities.
- Allied countries could greatly benefit from building a strong “coalition culture,” meaning awareness of the characteristics of effective coalitions and a commitment to provide coalitions with those characteristics.
- Enhancing U.S.-European coalition effectiveness over the coming decade will take a major effort of political will on both sides of the Atlantic; in Europe to produce the necessary capabilities, and in the U.S. to overcome entrenched bureaucratic and political opposition towards necessary measures, in particular technology transfer reform.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

**To establish a foundation for improved transatlantic and European-led coalitions, the U.S. and European countries should:**

- Issue a “coalition capabilities declaration,” whereby they undertake to give a high priority to the requirements of coalition operations in defense policy, planning and acquisition decisions.
- Undertake increased levels of multinational military exchange, including the strengthening of ties in military doctrine centers, joint and service schools, increased numbers of coalition assignments, taking coalition “skills” (such as foreign language ability) into account in promotion boards, and increasing military postings in other countries.
- Host permanent allied exchange and liaison officers at key national headquarters responsible for contingency planning of operations likely to involve transatlantic or European-led coalitions.
- Increase substantially politico-military exchanges and exercising among key potential contributing nations, NATO, and the EU, covering the full range of potential coalition constructions and new mission scenarios.

- Set up independent, multinational assessments to evaluate “lessons learned” from coalition operations, including cooperability issues, political-military decision-making, and the role of national contributions.

**To enhance its crucial role as a facilitator of coalition operations, NATO should:**

- Establish that SACEUR and SACLANT (or any successor command) have among their key responsibilities to serve as coalition construction facilitators, points of contact between military partners, and coordinators of member state and partner contributions to coalition operations.
- Task SACLANT or any successor command to act as a key point of contact between European NATO militaries and the U.S. based military, in particular with JFCOM on force transformation and network-centric concept development.
- Continue to evolve SHAPE contingency planning to reflect potential future missions of transatlantic and European-led coalitions and thereby play an invaluable role in multinational contingency planning

**To strengthen the contribution of European nations to both European and transatlantic coalitions, European nations should:**

- Adapt existing national and multinational units to establish an EU “spearhead force” of land, sea and air elements possessing specialized capabilities that would be at high readiness and would contribute to seizing the initiative in the early stages of an intervention whether as the advance force of an EU operation or in the company of U.S. forces.
- Focus on digitized C<sup>4</sup> and lift as the most urgent capability improvements for greatly strengthening the effectiveness of autonomous European coalitions, European-led coalitions with NATO/U.S. support, and U.S.-led coalitions.
- Implement reliable interim airlift solutions to guarantee necessary capability on short notice in time of crisis or conflict, until European forces acquire an effective long range transport capability.

## NOTES

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- Further develop ISR capabilities as an urgent area for capability improvements in order to ensure their availability for European operations, including situations where U.S. assets are otherwise engaged, as well as to provide the necessary complementarity in a U.S.-EU engagement. ISR assets are always in high demand and contribute to greater trust, cohesion, and operational effectiveness among coalition partners.

### **To strengthen cooperability between coalition countries:**

- The U.S. and European countries having the capability to act as “lead” or “framework” nations should engage in experimentation aimed at identifying and addressing the real issues of differences in U.S. and European doctrine and tempo as U.S. forces proceed with “transformation” and the adoption of network-centric concepts.
- Other European countries with important specialized capabilities should also be encouraged to develop them and ensure that they can plug into European or U.S.-led operations. Compatible standards/procedures, language training, and secure, interoperable communications are vital.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>In order to carry out this project, the U.S. Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology (U.S.-CREST) solicited the participation of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) in France, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Germany. The defense ministries in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the U.S. DoD, all agreed to participate in the study in an advisory capacity. The bulk of the project working group consisted of civilian and military officials from the three European defense ministries and the U.S. DoD, together with representatives from each of the research institutes. The working group’s assessments of the coalition interventions together with advice from the participating defense officials largely shaped the contents of this report, which does not necessarily represent official views.

<sup>2</sup>The term cooperability comes from a previous multinational working group project report, *Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead through Cooperability*. Cooperability refers to the different elements that determine the ability of coalition members to work effectively together, and thus includes the successful bridging of differences in doctrine, organization, concepts of operation, and culture, in addition to technical interoperability.

# NOTE DE SYNTHÈSE

Dans un environnement international de sécurité en mutation rapide, la capacité à mettre sur pied et à conduire des opérations transatlantiques en coalition devient à la fois plus nécessaire et plus difficile. En particulier, le développement d'une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) ne saura manquer d'avoir des conséquences sur les capacités des nations membres de l'OTAN et de l'Union Européenne (UE) à agir efficacement en coalition. Afin d'évaluer ces conséquences, U.S.-CREST a réuni un groupe d'experts français, américains, britanniques et allemands<sup>1</sup> afin d'analyser, à partir de scénarios plausibles de crise, l'influence probable de la PESD sur les concepts opérationnels, la composition des forces et les capacités militaires de futures opérations en coalition en 2005 et en 2015.

## CONCLUSIONS

### PESD, OTAN et coopération<sup>2</sup>

- La PESD devrait permettre de réduire les différences capacitaires entre l'Europe et les États-Unis. En effet, les processus entamés dans le cadre de la PESD prennent bien en compte la nécessité, pour les nations européennes, d'améliorer leurs moyens militaires afin d'être en mesure de conduire les opérations de l'UE.
- Certaines nations européennes aspirent aussi à conserver des capacités de combat de haute intensité, à la fois au plan national et pour les intégrer dans une coalition dans le cas d'un conflit de plus grande échelle.
- Les Européens font graduellement évoluer leurs priorités d'équipement vers l'intégration des moyens de commandement, de contrôle, de communication et de renseignement (C<sup>3</sup>R) et accordent un rôle croissant aux frappes de précision à distance, aux engins-robots, aux actions rapides et décisives dans un cadre

## **NOTE DE SYNTHÈSE**

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interarmées. En particulier, d'ici 2005, certaines nations européennes commenceront à déployer de nouveaux systèmes tout à fait significatifs de frappe de précision à distance de sécurité.

- Les concepts d'interventions militaires européennes autonomes seront différents de ceux développés par les forces américaines, du fait des écarts entre les conceptions du rôle de la puissance militaire, les concepts d'emploi des forces, les capacités et les doctrines ; cependant, au prix d'efforts appropriés des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, ces concepts devraient rester suffisamment compatibles pour assurer une coopération satisfaisante.
- L'interopérabilité des moyens de C<sup>3</sup>R entre l'Europe et les États-Unis est essentielle pour que les Européens puissent tirer parti de moyens américains, ainsi que pour la conduite efficace d'opérations en coalition. De plus, elle permettra aux États-Unis d'exploiter à temps des informations complémentaires de source européenne. Il est essentiel d'être à même d'établir une représentation commune de la situation opérationnelle pour tous les partenaires de coalition.
- Un meilleur partage du renseignement aux niveaux opérationnels et stratégiques est particulièrement important, entre les États-Unis et leurs partenaires européens ainsi qu'entre Européens. Il est nécessaire de développer des mécanismes communs pour assurer ce partage.
- Il serait particulièrement contre-productif d'envisager une « division du travail » où les États-Unis feraient la guerre pendant que les Européens se limiteraient à des opérations de soutien de la paix. En effet, outre ses difficultés politiques, ce partage fonctionnel ne résoudrait pas les problèmes essentiels de connectivité, de standardisation et de doctrine que pose une réelle coopération transatlantique.

### **Capacités d'intervention européennes**

- D'ici 2005, l'UE ou une coalition plus restreinte des nations européennes militairement les mieux préparées pourra conduire

des opérations autonomes allant de l'intervention éloignée à caractère humanitaire jusqu'à des missions d'intervention de forte intensité, pourvu d'adapter les objectifs et les concepts opérationnels aux capacités disponibles.

- Cependant, à cette échéance, les décideurs politiques pourraient hésiter à entreprendre certaines interventions du fait des difficultés opérationnelles résultant des insuffisances capacitaires généralement admises.
- En 2015, si les programmes prévus sont effectivement réalisés, les nations européennes devraient être à même de conduire des opérations humanitaire à grande distance et des missions d'intervention de forte intensité avec un niveau de risque militaire et politique nettement réduit.
- Dans ces conditions et toujours en 2015, les nations européennes pourraient apporter de substantielles capacités interarmées à une intervention conduite par les États-Unis dans un conflit régional, en particulier en assurant une importante contribution terrestre, l'Europe jouant alors un rôle significatif dans la conduite politique et militaire du conflit.
- La réalisation des programmes européens d'amélioration en cours ou envisagés d'ici à 2015 nécessitera sans aucun doute une augmentation des budgets de défense. Cependant, une rationalisation des capacités à l'échelle européenne permettrait d'éviter une croissance trop importante des budgets.
- Les nations européennes pourraient également considérablement renforcer l'efficacité de coalitions européennes et transatlantiques par la création d'une force européenne de première intervention comportant des éléments aériens, navals et terrestres. Cette force pourrait contribuer à une réaction rapide propre à l'UE ainsi qu'à la satisfaction des besoins et des missions de l'OTAN.

### Interfaces politiques et militaires

- La complexité inhérente aux interventions en coalition et la difficulté croissante des prises de décision au sein des instances en

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cours d'élargissement de l'OTAN et de l'Union Européenne requièrent la mise en place de dispositifs plus efficaces facilitant les consultations politico-militaires à plusieurs niveaux entre acteurs interdépendants.

### **Vers la coopération transatlantique**

- Les États-Unis sont sans doute capables d'atteindre leurs objectifs militaires sans beaucoup d'aide de leurs alliés ; cependant, dans bien des cas, en Europe et hors d'Europe, il est peu probable qu'ils puissent « gagner la paix » sans l'assistance militaire (et non militaire) des Européens.
- Même si l'on tient compte de l'amélioration programmée des capacités européennes entre 2005 et 2015, les interventions conduites par des Européens auront tout intérêt à pouvoir faire appel au soutien américain pour prévenir les risques d'escalade.
- Toutes les nations alliées auraient donc intérêt à développer une forte « culture de coalition », c'est-à-dire à identifier les exigences à remplir pour qu'une coalition soit efficace et à s'engager à en tenir compte.
- Des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, un effort politique notable devra être consenti pour augmenter l'efficacité des coalitions ; l'Europe devra effectivement se doter des structures et des capacités nécessaires et les États-Unis devront surmonter l'opposition politique et les obstacles administratifs envers les mesures nécessaires, notamment en ce qui concerne les transferts de technologie.

## **RECOMMANDATIONS**

**Afin d'améliorer le fonctionnement d'opérations en coalition, les États-Unis et l'Europe devraient :**

- Adopter une « déclaration de capacités en coalition » les engageant à accorder une priorité accrue aux capacités nécessaires aux opérations en coalition à tous les niveaux : politique de défense, planification, acquisition et équipement des forces.

- Développer les échanges militaires, notamment par le renforcement des liens entre centres de doctrine et écoles interarmées ou d'armée, l'accroissement du nombre de postes en organismes multinationaux ou à l'étranger et la prise en compte, dans le processus d'avancement du personnel, d'aptitudes particulières aux opérations en coalition (expérience multinationale, connaissance de langues étrangères).
- Accueillir en permanence des officiers de liaison et d'échange alliés au sein des principaux états-majors nationaux de planification et de conduite des opérations susceptibles de participer à la mise sur pied de futures coalitions transatlantiques ou européennes.
- Accroître substantiellement les échanges, les rencontres et les exercices au niveau politico-militaire impliquant les principales nations de l'OTAN et de l'Union Européenne ; ces activités devraient couvrir un large éventail de missions et de coalitions.
- Organiser l'analyse indépendante et multinationale du retour d'expérience des opérations en coalition, afin de pouvoir en tirer des enseignements communs en matière de prise de décision politique et militaire, de planification, de commandement et de contrôle des opérations, d'emploi et de coopération, afin également d'évaluer les différentes contributions nationales.

**Pour renforcer son rôle essentiel d'appui aux opérations en coalition, l'OTAN devrait :**

- Déclarer qu'une responsabilité essentielle des commandants suprêmes (SACEUR et SACLANT ou son successeur) est de faciliter la constitution de coalitions, de contribuer à la concertation militaire et de coordonner les contributions des États membres et de leurs partenaires.
- Charger SACLANT ou son successeur de jouer le rôle de coordinateur des membres européens de l'OTAN auprès des commandements U.S. basés aux États-Unis, en particulier avec le commandement des forces interarmées (JFCOM) pour ce qui concerne la transformation des forces et le développement de concepts réseau-centriques.

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- Poursuivre l'adaptation des capacités de planification de crise de SHAPE, afin de lui permettre de mieux prendre en compte les nouvelles données relatives aux opérations en coalition transatlantiques ou menées par les nations européennes, contribuant ainsi très efficacement à la planification multinationale de crise.

### **Afin de renforcer leur aptitude à participer aux opérations européennes et transatlantiques en coalition, les Européens devraient :**

- Adapter les unités nationales et multinationales européennes existantes afin de constituer une force européenne d'intervention d'urgence composée d'éléments terrestres, aériens et maritimes spécialisés dans la réaction immédiate et rapide ; cette force permettrait la prise d'initiative européenne dès le début des crises, soit de façon autonome, soit de concert avec des forces américaines.
- Donner la priorité à l'amélioration des systèmes protégés et interopérables de communication, d'information et d'aide au commandement ainsi qu'aux capacités de projection de forces, améliorant ainsi très sensiblement leur aptitude à participer à la résolution des crises, avec ou sans soutien des moyens collectifs de l'OTAN ou américains ; de plus, cela renforcerait la crédibilité et la dimension politique de la contribution européenne aux opérations dirigées par les États-Unis.
- Mettre en oeuvre une solution intérimaire fiable et robuste de transport aérien stratégique afin de disposer au plus tôt de capacités adéquates de projection d'ici la mise en service opérationnel de moyens propres aux Européens.
- Poursuivre de façon prioritaire le développement de leurs capacités de renseignement, d'abord pour en assurer la disponibilité au profit de leurs propres opérations, notamment si les moyens américains devaient être hypothéqués par ailleurs, mais aussi pour être à même de fournir des capacités complémentaires dans une opération commune entre Américains et Européens. En effet, de telles capacités sont toujours nécessaires et permettent d'améliorer la confiance, la cohésion et l'efficacité opérationnelle des partenaires de coalition.

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**Pour améliorer la coopération entre les partenaires en coalition :**

- Les États-Unis et les nations européennes capables de diriger une coalition ou de servir de nation-cadre devraient initier un programme d'analyse, d'évaluation et d'expérimentation, pour mieux apprécier les différences entre les doctrines et les styles d'opérations envisagés des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, ainsi que les conséquences de la transformation en cours des forces américaines et des restructurations des forces européennes, compte-tenu de l'évolution du contexte stratégique et des nouvelles possibilités offertes par la technologie.
- Les autres nations européennes disposant de capacités spécialisées notables devraient également être encouragés à en poursuivre le développement, de façon qu'elles puissent s'insérer à leur juste place et le plus efficacement possible, soit au sein d'opérations européennes, soit dans une coalition transatlantique. L'importance de la compatibilité des standards, des procédures, des communications interopérables et sécurisées ne saurait être sous-estimée.

**NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>Pour réaliser cette étude, U.S.-CREST (U.S. Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology) a sollicité la participation du RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) au Royaume-Uni, de la FRS (Fondation pour la recherche stratégique) en France et du SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) en Allemagne. Le département de la défense américain (DoD) ainsi que les ministères de la défense français, britanniques et allemands ont tous accepté de participer à cette étude en tant que conseillers. L'essentiel du groupe de travail a été constitué par des officiels civils ou militaires des trois ministères de la défense européens et du DoD ainsi que de membres des instituts de recherche participant. Les résultats des évaluations interactives conduites par le groupe ainsi que les conseils de représentants étatiques participant au projet ont largement contribué au contenu de ce rapport qui ne représente néanmoins pas nécessairement des positions officielles.

<sup>2</sup>La notion de « coopération » a été introduite dans le rapport résumant les travaux d'un précédent groupe de travail multinational intitulé *Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability*. Au delà de la simple interopérabilité technique, la coopération est fonction des divers éléments qui permettent aux membres d'une coalition d'interagir efficacement : doctrine, organisation, concepts opérationnels, culture stratégique transatlantique.



# I. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT

## THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

There is much speculation today about the gap not only between U.S. and European military capabilities but also between U.S. and European philosophies concerning the use of force. Such philosophical differences have deep historical roots, but remained partially hidden by the Cold War premise that if the Soviet Union and its allies attacked Europe, all the allies would respond with whatever force was necessary to repel the attack. While the distance between U.S. and European approaches is real, it also can be exaggerated.

When the transatlantic alliance was shaped in the late 1940s and early 1950s, one major European power (Germany) had been defeated and devastated. France and Great Britain had been on the winning side but were being displaced by the United States as the West's leading power. The Soviet Union, having suffered greatly in the war, was nonetheless establishing itself as a world-class military power. As the years passed, the transatlantic alliance was increasingly dominated by the ascendance of American power and the decline of Europe's military capacities and roles. The European powers became increasingly reliant on "civilian" capacities for their international roles. France and the United Kingdom retained strong military cultures and interventionist philosophies, which nonetheless coexisted somewhat uneasily with their declining military power.

It is also true that the Europeans, having hosted two world wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, tended to accept vulnerability to the use of force as a fact of life, as undesirable as it might be. The United States, on the other hand, regarded vulnerability as an unacceptable condition. The attack on Pearl Harbor, perhaps because it occurred on an outpost of U.S. territory and did not directly affect the mainland, left Americans

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believing that the goal of invulnerability remained a valid U.S. national objective.

It is easy to overgeneralize, but it does appear that the divergence in U.S. versus European military capabilities and attitudes toward vulnerability over the years has contributed to different instincts concerning the use of force on behalf of national interests. The Europeans, facing a constant decline in their ability to project and sustain force beyond their borders, leaned increasingly on diplomatic finesse and economic largesse to sustain influence in the world.

The United States meanwhile, having built a large and capable military establishment, became more willing than Europe to use force to diminish its vulnerability, promote its ideology, and accomplish American foreign policy goals. The terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> further increased this U.S. emphasis on military capability and the divergence in U.S.-European perspectives towards the use of force.

Within Europe, varied national experiences and cultures produced sufficient differences among European states to ensure that any generalization about “Europe” would be lacking in some way. Germany’s attitudes toward the use of force were first imposed on it by World War II’s victorious powers. The concept of Germany as a state that could not legitimately use force on behalf of national interests was then internalized by a West Germany whose goal was to be accepted and respected for its peaceful ways. Some smaller European states essentially embraced Germany’s model not because of the outcome of World War II but because they had insufficient resources to support military capabilities that made much sense in anything other than a multilateral setting, like NATO or the United Nations. Italy found itself comfortably on the fringes of the Cold War confrontation in Central Europe, but now is in the process of adjusting to the fact that its location in the south of Europe puts it on the front lines of the new challenges to Western interests.

On the other hand, the idea that force could and sometimes should be used in defense of national interests remained strong in France and the United Kingdom. In fact, France’s considerable sense of national pride supported the maintenance of independent and militarily significant capabilities for much of the Cold War. The UK’s close historic and cultural ties to the United States, its colonial heritage, and “independence” for many years from the process of political and

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economic integration on the continent produced its own unique culture which backed a continued “global” military role.

Following the Cold War, there has been more convergence than divergence among the European countries. While France and the UK continue to view the potential use of force as an important instrument for promoting national interests, financial limitations have forced them to accept that they will deploy their military capabilities in the future very largely within multilateral frameworks such as the EU and NATO. Although Germany has retained a preference for not using force to resolve international problems, it has step-by-step moved away from the rigid self-imposed constraints on the role of German armed forces in international affairs. All EU countries attach far more importance than the United States does to obtaining UN legitimization for military operations that do not involve self-defense.

In spite of these changing world roles, capabilities and perspectives, the United States and the European powers still have a large set of convergent interests on a wide range of issues. The values underlying the relationship remain fundamentally intact, and even on the most difficult of issues, such as the Middle East, the United States and Europe share much in common (support for Israel’s survival and creation of a Palestinian state, for example). The differences are largely with regard to strategy and tactics. Even though such differences are real and difficult to manage, they often are exaggerated by the press and pundits. Frequently, what is described as “transatlantic” differences are also sources of division within the United States and among European countries as well.

There is no reason why the United States and its European allies should not be able to overcome the current crisis in the relationship and enhance the quality of their alliance if they choose to do so and act upon that choice.

All three coalition constructions considered in this project could play real and important roles meeting future U.S. and European security needs. Each of the three possible ways of operating transatlantic military forces, however, will require political attention and appropriate resources to ensure that they all become available as credible military options.

The capacity of the European Union to conduct its own military operations could be critically important at a time when U.S. forces are committed elsewhere or when Europeans view a crisis as engaging

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important security interests while the United States does not. It is also possible that U.S. and European policymakers will choose to respond to some future crisis with an EU-led coalition simply to demonstrate and exercise the capacity in a real-world situation where the probability of success is high.

EU-led operations with the support of NATO and the United States could be designed to avoid placing unreasonable demands on U.S. military resources while providing a larger margin of confidence for Europeans to take on more complex and demanding military operations. At least in the foreseeable future, the U.S.-NATO backup could be the critical difference between an EU decision to conduct an operation with largely European resources or to avoid such a choice.

At the same time, it will be vitally important for European states to sustain the ability of their forces to interoperate both technically and doctrinally with U.S. forces in high intensity combat operations. NATO, with its integrated command structure, continues to provide the framework and mechanisms for enabling future coalition operations all along the spectrum of military scenarios, whether under the flag of NATO, EU, or an ad hoc coalition. Its role in preserving the day-to-day habits of political and military cooperation will remain essential to the United States and Europe.

For the United States, the ability of Europeans to make substantial contributions to U.S.-led operations could provide major political and military benefits. Even though the United States could conduct many future military operations on its own, virtually all imaginable scenarios would benefit from the broad political support and additional military assets that a transatlantic military coalition would offer. The participation of European militaries could provide important relief for U.S. forces that may at times become severely overstretched.

For Europe, the continued ability to make meaningful contributions to U.S.-led combat operations is a basic requirement for maintaining U.S. interest in NATO as a military organization and U.S. military engagement with Europe. Serious European attempts to contribute to U.S.-led combat operations will likely enhance U.S. willingness to participate in or support a broader range of peace-support operations. This is not a “grand bargain,” but simply a fact of life. A serious European military role in transatlantic military operations also will increase European influence on U.S. political/military decision-making.

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European allies currently provide, and will likely continue to provide, major ground contributions for peace support operations. Most such operations are currently in Europe (in the Balkans) but Europeans also are playing a major and frequently underestimated military role in Afghanistan. These European roles already serve vital U.S. security interests, particularly in the war on terrorism. This is obviously the case in Afghanistan, but it is also likely that an unstable Balkans would become a major new base for al Qaeda operations.

Moreover, the distinction between “combat” and “peace support” operations is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Events can easily transform a peace support mission into a combat operation. Likewise, a combat scenario almost inevitably will be followed by a period in which peace support forces are required.

The transition between these phases can potentially be prolonged and messy. Afghanistan has demonstrated that future interventions will need to integrate, in the same concept, combat operations and operations to control violence. Both U.S. and European forces therefore will need the capacity to operate effectively and together across the full spectrum of military operations.

## **ORGANIZING THE RELATIONSHIP: NATO, ESDI, AND CESDP**

One of the questions that gave rise to this study is whether the prospects for more effective European defense efforts are enhanced by the process of European integration. Will the process of uniting Europe give the EU states the political rationale and motivation for defense improvements required to keep transatlantic military cooperation alive and well? Or, on the other hand, might the process encourage the emergence of a separate and incompatible European approach to the use of force, increasing transatlantic divergences?

By 2002, the EU “autonomous” CESDP had established itself as the center around which future European defense cooperation will develop. However, CESDP has a background in the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that still influences perspectives on and the future of CESDP.

The European Security and Defense Identity was a European “idea” that was then supported by the United States and NATO more broadly.

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In the 1990s, the NATO allies tried to make ESDI part of NATO structure and strategy. For a variety of reasons, those attempts failed. Nevertheless, the fundamental concept of the ESDI approach in the 1990s – ensuring that European defense cooperation remained framed by transatlantic defense cooperation – remains very much alive and to some extent in conflict with the CESDP approach.

As the United States perceived increased momentum toward European agreement on a defense identity early in 1991, U.S. Ambassador to NATO William Taft IV, in speeches delivered in February and March, supported a stronger “European pillar” in the alliance based on a revival of the Western European Union (WEU), but cautioned that the European pillar should not relax the central transatlantic bond, should not duplicate current cooperation in NATO, and should not leave out countries that are not members of the European Community.

In spite of such concerns, NATO’s December 1991 “New Strategic Concept” supported the goal of the European members of NATO assuming greater responsibility for their own security, while ensuring that NATO remained “. . . the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.” In the wake of NATO’s new strategic concept, the members of the European Community signed the Maastricht Treaty transforming the “EC” into the European Union. The treaty included a commitment to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy” that would eventually include “framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”

The treaty designated the Western European Union as the organization responsible for implementing defense aspects of the EU’s decisions on foreign and security policy. The WEU members subsequently agreed (at Petersberg, Germany in 1992) that they would use WEU military forces for joint operations in humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace enforcement – the so-called “Petersberg tasks.”

At the same time, the Bush administration issued strong warnings to the German and French governments concerning their plans to create a Franco-German military corps of some 35,000 troops. U.S. officials reportedly expressed reservations about the degree to which the corps would displace NATO as the focus of European defense efforts and

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undermine domestic support in the United States for a continuing U.S. presence in Europe.

In January 1994, the NATO Brussels summit acknowledged the important role that ESDI could play in the evolving European security system. The meeting approved the idea of creating Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters, designed to give NATO's command structure additional flexibility to accomplish a variety of objectives, including to facilitate the dual use of NATO forces and command structures for alliance operations and/or those run by the WEU.

NATO's work to implement the January 1994 agreements in principle moved ahead slowly until NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Berlin, Germany in June 1996, agreed to implement the CJTF concept and create an ESDI within the alliance by making NATO "assets and capabilities" available for future military operations commanded by the Western European Union. To facilitate such operations, European officers in the NATO structure would, when appropriate, shift from their NATO responsibilities to WEU command positions.

The Berlin ministerial marked a watershed in the development of U.S. and NATO policy toward creation of a more coherent European role in the alliance, but even after Berlin, the question was what military tasks the Europeans could actually perform within the framework of the new arrangements. They did not have the combination of military resources and political will to take on operations like the successive peace implementation and stabilization forces (IFOR and SFOR) in Bosnia, and the United States provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia over Kosovo.

In June 1997, the EU members approved the Treaty of Amsterdam designed to strengthen the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam included a reference to the "Petersberg tasks" and authorized the adoption of EU common strategies. It also created the position of "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy."

In the autumn of 1998, the shape of the discussion on European defense was changed profoundly by British Prime Minister Tony Blair's decision to make a major push for an EU role in defense. In several speeches, Blair bemoaned the fact that Europe's ability for autonomous military action was so limited and called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic alliance.

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Early in December 1998 Blair and French President Jacques Chirac met in St. Malo, France. The resulting St. Malo declaration envisioned creation of a Common European Security and Defense Policy with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act “autonomously” should NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action. The statement included the following key elements:

- the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage;
- the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so;
- the NATO and WEU collective defense commitments of the EU members must be maintained, obligations to NATO honored, and the various positions of European states in relation to NATO must otherwise be respected;
- the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication;
- Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.

The Clinton administration’s formal reaction took the traditional form of the “yes, but” approach characterized earlier. Just days after St. Malo, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright formally declared the administration’s support *but* cautioned the Europeans against “the three D’s”: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. Albright said the allies should not duplicate what already was being done effectively in NATO. More fundamentally, the new European initiative should not in any way “decouple” or “de-link” the United States from Europe in the alliance, or the European defense efforts from those coordinated through NATO. Finally, Albright insisted there be no discrimination against NATO allies who were not members of the EU.

In spite of these qualifications on U.S. support for the initiative, it moved ahead, in parallel with NATO’s conduct of the air campaign over

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Kosovo. The Kosovo experience added impetus to the Blair approach. From the U.S. perspective, the fact that the allies for the most part were not able to contribute more substantially to such a high-tech, low casualty campaign suggested the wisdom of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI, adopted at NATO's April 1999 Washington Summit, was designed to stimulate European defense efforts to help them catch up with the U.S. "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). From the European perspective, the Kosovo experience clearly demonstrated Europe's (undesirable and growing) military dependence on the United States and the need to get together to do something about it.

The Washington Summit communiqué and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept reflected transatlantic agreement that European defense capabilities needed a serious boost and that it had to be done in ways consistent with the U.S. "three D's." The St. Malo accord was endorsed by all EU members at meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999).

By the end of 1999, the EU had produced a major initiative based on the guidelines of the St. Malo statement. EU members agreed that Javier Solana, in addition to serving as the Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, would become WEU Secretary General to help pave the way for implementation of the decision confirmed at Cologne to merge the WEU within the EU.

In Helsinki, the EU members declared their determination "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises." They noted that the process "will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army." The EU members continued to reiterate that collective defense remained a NATO responsibility, and would not be challenged by the new EU arrangements. They agreed on several substantial steps, called the "Helsinki Headline Goals," required to implement their political commitment, including:

- to establish by 2003 a corps-size intervention force of up to 60,000 persons from EU member state armed forces, capable of deploying within 60 days and being sustained for at least one year;

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- to create new political and military bodies to allow the European Council to provide political guidance and strategic direction to joint military operations;
- to develop modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the “needs” of all EU Member States (particularly the fact that four EU members – Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden – are not NATO members);
- to make “appropriate” arrangements to allow non-EU European NATO members and others to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to improve coordination of EU and member state political, economic and other non-military instruments in ways that might mitigate the need to resort to the use of force or make military actions more effective when they become necessary.

With the proclaimed EU goal of establishing an “autonomous” Common European Security and Defense Policy, a more formal NATO-EU relationship clearly was required. In September 2000, NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU’s “Interim” Political and Security Committee (COPSI) began meeting to work out details of the arrangement and to establish a pattern and format for cooperation. Meanwhile, four EU/NATO working groups began work on: security of sensitive information, Berlin-plus (ESDI initiatives to facilitate more coherent European contributions within the NATO framework), military capabilities, and permanent EU/NATO institutional arrangements.

In November 2000, the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference produced an inventory of resources that included about 100,000 soldiers, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 ships, including two aircraft carriers. In addition, non-EU NATO members and EU associate partners pledged capabilities that could join in future EU operations.

In the Clinton administration’s last major initiative regarding EU/NATO relations, Secretary of Defense William Cohen on October 10, 2000 strongly endorsed the development of CESDP, saying that “we agree with this goal – not grudgingly, not with resignation, but

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with wholehearted conviction.” At the same time, Cohen suggested that it was hard to imagine a future case in which the United States and the EU would diverge dramatically on whether or not a crisis situation warranted a joint response. Secretary Cohen’s remarks made it clear how important it would be to ensure that NATO and EU military planning move forward hand in hand, in whatever institutional construct proved acceptable to all parties.

At the end of the year, the NATO/EU negotiations came close to agreement on how to work together in the future. During the December 14–15 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the NATO allies were able to note that progress had been made in the four working groups. They welcomed the European Union’s agreement at its summit in Nice, France earlier in December that there should be a “regular pattern” of meetings at all levels between the EU and NATO.

The allies also stated their intention to make arrangements for: “. . . assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; the identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the further adaptation of the Alliance’s defense planning system, taking account of relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will be consulted on the EU’s proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to the decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed during the operation.”

However, at the end of the day, the government of Turkey blocked consensus to permit the EU “assured access” to NATO planning, and therefore prevented final agreement on the whole NATO/EU package. Ankara had wanted the EU to grant the Turkish government veto power over the EU’s deployment of a military force under circumstances that could affect Turkey’s security. (By mid-2002, the problem had not been resolved as Greece had refused to approve a compromise worked out between Turkey and EU negotiators late in 2001.)

In 2001, when George W. Bush assumed the U.S. presidency, British Prime Minister Tony Blair hurried to Washington to reassure the new administration that CESDP would not hurt NATO. The Bush administration’s reaffirmation of U.S. support for the CESDP initiative was

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necessary because the incoming administration was known to have concerns similar to those expressed earlier by the Clinton administration.

Following President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Blair, the new administration appeared to settle into a relatively passive approach toward CESDP. However, following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on the United States, the depth of administration skepticism about European defense efforts became apparent. The administration shifted its focus to capabilities that the European allies would be willing and able to contribute to the near-term requirements of the war against terrorism. Discussion of the longer-term impact of CESDP seemed a much lower priority.

Nevertheless, the conduct of the war on terrorism has raised serious questions about European priorities reflected in CESDP and in the still-falling levels of defense spending in most European countries. Some Bush administration officials have questioned the wisdom of counting on future improvements in European defense capabilities. Some Europeans meanwhile questioned whether there is any hope to keep up with the pace of improvements in U.S. defense capabilities and raised the possibility of a "division of labor" in which the United States would take care of most "warfighting" scenarios while Europeans looked after less demanding military situations.

This growing debate only added to the importance of greater clarity concerning what European military forces would or would not be able to do in the future, whether in NATO, EU, or ad hoc coalition formations. It also raised the important question of whether European priorities should be placed on developing their ability to function in NATO coalitions with the United States (as in the "ESDP" concept) or on operating autonomously with the support of NATO and the United States (as in the CESDP concept).

## **CESDP AND THE CHALLENGES TO U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERABILITY**

Beginning in 1997, stark predictions of future U.S.-European inability to operate together proliferated within the transatlantic security community. In an example of one statement among many, a *Financial Times* article that year noted: "The ever-growing U.S. lead in defense information technology means that fighting alongside allies is not merely

unnecessary, it can be downright inconvenient.” Events during the remainder of the decade and into the new century appeared to bear out these forecasts.

During the 1999 Kosovo campaign, many European countries had no or only limited capabilities for carrying out secure, advanced communications; for acquiring, integrating and rapidly exploiting intelligence data; for conducting stand-off precision strikes, especially at night or under inclement weather conditions; for suppressing and penetrating enemy air defenses, and for conducting battle damage assessment. Poor weather conditions during the early stages of the campaign thus curtailed sorties by European aircraft, although by the end of the war European air forces had flown almost as many strike-attack sorties as their U.S. counterparts. Still, U.S. aircraft conducted 71% of overall support sorties, over 90% of advanced intelligence and reconnaissance missions, over 90% of electronic warfare missions that used dedicated aircraft, fired over 85% of the precision guided weapons used, and over 95% of the cruise missiles. Overall European inability to contribute in a meaningful way to the initial phase of the Afghanistan intervention, a tightly focused, high-tech air campaign far from Europe’s borders, further underscored allied insufficiencies in the areas of force projection, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR), and precision strike.

The large U.S. defense spending increases implemented in the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks point towards a worsening of the capability gap, with the U.S. moving rapidly ahead on “force transformation” and the Europeans getting left increasingly far behind. U.S. force transformation entails the development of new operational concepts and capabilities in order to implement radically new ways of conducting military operations. Transformed U.S. forces would be highly networked through digitized command, control, communications and computer (C<sup>4</sup>) systems, creating real time “sensor-to-shooter” links, a common operational picture (COP) between forces engaged in an operation, and greater sustainability and speed of command due to this shared situational awareness.

Information technologies and network-centric capability are key enablers for achieving the goal set out in *Joint Vision 2020* of creating a military force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. *Joint Vision 2020* develops the same operational concepts as its predecessor document, *Joint Vision 2010*,<sup>1</sup> but devotes more

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attention to interoperability (between services, agencies, and allies), to military operations other than war, and to the need to integrate more fully interagency coordination and multinational operations.

Despite the impression left by the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> defense spending increases, the process of U.S. force transformation will remain a lengthy one for at least four reasons. First, much of the defense spending increases to date have gone towards operations and maintenance as well as towards filling a considerable gap in procurement funding left by the Clinton administration. Although DoD is increasing spending on “transformational” capabilities, the amounts will not be limitless. Second, it will take considerable time for the U.S. to build the joint, integrated C<sup>4</sup>ISR architecture that constitutes a critical foundation for force transformation. Third, the concepts associated with network-centric warfare are as yet unproven, and require extensive experimentation for further development and validation. Fourth, the U.S. has not yet developed some of the key technologies needed for force transformation, or brought others along to sufficiently advanced levels.

Thus, DoD’s 2001 report to Congress on network-centric warfare states that achieving the very high level of “jointness” between the different military services as well as the other tasks required to build a network-centric force constitutes a monumental endeavor that will “span a quarter century or more.” Substantial legacy forces will coexist alongside transformed ones during this period. DoD will thus need to provide for “backward compatibility” between transformed American forces and these legacy ones, which should assist in doing so with European forces as well.

The above observations are not meant to minimize the severity of the effort required to maintain and enhance U.S.-European cooperability in a context of much higher U.S. defense spending, but only to establish some sense of proportion around it. Moreover, while statements showing the large disparities between U.S. and European military capabilities provide impressive illustration of U.S. global military dominance, they are essentially meaningless in terms of the real military issues facing Europe. U.S. forces will remain well ahead of European ones in qualitative terms as well as in many quantitative measures. The fundamental task for European countries has been to determine the military capabilities needed to achieve their two key objectives of being able to undertake certain operations on their own, or with limited U.S. support, and of remaining sufficiently in contact with U.S. capabilities

to make a substantial contribution to U.S.-led operations in which they choose to participate.

CESDP has been somewhat helpful to date in pushing European countries towards acquiring the military capabilities needed to achieve these two objectives. The development of CESDP was a major consideration in Italian and German decisions to implement initial steps towards professionalization of their armed forces. The process of developing the capabilities to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goal led in late 2001 to the initiation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), designed to assist in remedying identified European capability shortcomings. ECAP is almost completely convergent with the NATO DCI. Where differences exist, they are much less on capability areas than on the specific details of how to meet an agreed requirement. The Helsinki process and ECAP have thus brought a much needed reinforcement to DCI and to the more focused successor capability initiative that will emerge from NATO's Prague summit in November 2002.

This reinforcement is even more important insofar as many European countries may respond more assiduously to an EU process than to a NATO one, given the habits formed in Europe of working very closely together on key areas of national policy. Within the NATO framework, many European countries also became used to relying heavily on U.S. capabilities, while CESDP stresses the need for EU member states to make a substantial military contribution to transatlantic security. Although major obstacles stand in the way of greater defense spending in most European countries, CESDP may increase the Europe-wide impact of the defense budget increases that the UK announced in mid-2002 and that France announced in September 2002 when it unveiled its new five-year military program law. These British and French efforts may have more of a pulling effect elsewhere in Europe than would have been the case in the absence of CESDP. Nonetheless, CESDP's ability to help deliver European capability improvements remains very largely a potential one, based on its providing a framework for long-term rationalization of European defense efforts through pooling of assets, role sharing, harmonizing requirements, and other mechanisms to obtain greater efficiency in European defense spending.

Despite these potential benefits of CESDP, its current focus on the Petersberg tasks has led some U.S. defense experts to express concern that it will drive Europeans to limit their efforts to the "low end" of

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the combat spectrum in terms of weapons systems, concepts, and doctrine, versus an increasing U.S. emphasis on high-intensity warfighting capabilities. Rather than help narrow U.S.-European capability gaps, it would thus intensify them.

European countries hold a wide range of views regarding what constitutes a Petersberg task. Nonetheless, the peacemaking mission within the Petersberg tasks is widely taken as including the forcible separation of combatants. Although coalition forces in a peacemaking mission will be predominantly engaged in inducement of potential and actual belligerents to acquiescence and compliance, the possibility that the situation may deteriorate into the outbreak of full scale combat means that coalition forces may find themselves in situations similar to those of regional conflict. Military commanders and staffs will usually advise, therefore, that the capability packages fielded for peace enforcement are adequate to meet the challenge of escalation to regional conflict at least for a sufficient period to allow for the forces to be extracted. In a generic sense, it is not possible to make a qualitative distinction between the capability packages required for the conduct of peace enforcement from those for regional conflict, although there will be differences in the proportions of the various capabilities.<sup>2</sup>

Most European countries therefore recognize that peace enforcement operations must be conducted by combat forces, prepared to switch rapidly from peace to combat situations. Moreover, although CESDP is currently limited to the Petersberg tasks, in time it may expand beyond them. There is also an important distinction to be made between CESDP and the defense policies and capabilities of individual European nations. Regardless of how far CESDP's ambitions may extend, individual nations in Europe strongly aspire to retain and further develop high intensity combat capabilities, including the ability to undertake certain combat operations on a national basis as well as to integrate into a coalition framework in cases of larger scale conflict. Indeed, in each EU country, only a portion of national military resources are committed to CESDP. Chapters two and three of this report describe and analyze the significant improvements in warfighting capability that European militaries are planning to implement between 2002 and 2015.

To a certain extent, individual European nations, led by the UK, also aspire to follow the U.S. in a shift to network-centric concepts if they are proved to work. In July 2002 the UK MoD presented to

Parliament “A New Chapter” of its 1998 *Strategic Defence Review* (SDR). The conclusions of the new chapter SDR reinforced the “growing importance” the UK was already attaching to network-centric capability, and called for accelerated, increased investment in this area. There is a widespread belief in the French defense community that the increasing use of advanced information technologies will have a transformational impact on the military, and various programs to develop and deploy digitized C<sup>4</sup> systems have been underway for some time. For example, France has deployed a formation-level battlefield management system, which supports units from brigade size and above, in Bosnia since 1995. Germany has a prototype program to develop a new strategic level C<sup>4</sup>I system for the Bundeswehr, while Sweden is proceeding with a network based command and control demonstration program.

Some European countries have taken substantial steps towards promoting greater jointness between the military services. The UK has an exclusively joint versus single service acquisition process, and has taken other steps to rationalize relationships among the services, including joint-only logistics and the combining of all individual service colleges into a joint entity. Since the Gulf War, France has improved the jointness of its higher command and intelligence structure, established a multiservice special operations command, and implemented fully joint war college training; its integrated procurement executive dates from the early 1960’s.

Consequently, leading European countries are taking important steps to create force structures capable of exploiting the transformational possibilities offered by advanced information technologies. They are attempting not only to stay in contact with U.S. concept, doctrinal, and organizational developments through NATO activities such as allied concept development and experimentation (CDE), other multinational fora such as the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC),<sup>3</sup> and bilateral relationships, but are also in various cases leading multinational efforts to explore new concepts.

For example, the UK is the lead nation for a CDE project on “a framework for a multinational joint command concept,” which seeks to develop a concept of the nature of future command by identifying the likely fundamentals of command structures, organizations, and facilities that a multinational joint commander will need in undertaking a coalition operation. France is the lead nation for a CDE project on “information sharing within a coalition at various levels,” which is

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investigating possible architectures to enable the sharing of information at strategic, operational and tactical levels. This issue is a critical one for creation of the joint and combined C<sup>4</sup>ISR capability that the U.S. *Quadrennial Defense Review* Report of September 2001 established as a major objective for U.S. force transformation.

In summary, both the political and military challenges involved in forming effective transatlantic coalitions have grown sharper, but neither has become so great as to make the formation of such coalitions an unrealistic endeavor. The following chapters provide further justification and elaboration of this conclusion, and then propose measures for ensuring that it remains the case during the coming decade and beyond.

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<sup>1</sup>These concepts are dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

<sup>2</sup>This discussion of the operational requirements for peace enforcement missions is drawn from *Coalition Military Operations*, pp. 13–23; see Appendix D, page 105.

<sup>3</sup>The MIC, whose membership includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S., was set up to “address coalition operational requirements, identify coalition information interoperability issues, and develop solutions that positively impact on coalition operational policy, doctrine, and planning.”

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### COALITIONS AND CRISIS SCENARIOS

Table II.1 below describes the coalition constructions, crisis scenarios and interventions that the project subgroups examined in both 2005 and 2015 time frames. The 2005 evaluation used an opposing forces baseline description and foreseen coalition capabilities in the same time frame. The project performed a second evaluation assuming the crisis unfolded in 2015, using updated opposing forces capabilities and projected coalition means for that period. The project working group felt that U.S. or NATO leadership of a humanitarian operation in the Horn of Africa was politically less likely than that of the two EU-led coalition constructions, so the NATO/U.S.-led coalition construction did not undertake the intervention. The working group also decided that given projected defense capabilities, the two EU-led coalitions were unlikely to undertake a major regional conflict intervention in either a 2005 or 2015 time frame, and therefore did not evaluate this eventuality.

	<b>Crisis scenario #1</b> Renewed ethnic conflict in South-eastern Europe	<b>Crisis scenario #2</b> Regional conflict in the Arabian Peninsula	<b>Crisis scenario #3</b> Humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa
NATO/U.S.-led Coalition	Peace enforcement intervention	High intensity combat operations	N/A
EU-led with NATO/U.S. support	Peace enforcement intervention	N/A	Rescue and humanitarian support
EU autonomous	Peace enforcement intervention	N/A	Rescue and humanitarian support

Table II.1: Scenario Matrix

The project designed the crisis scenarios as tools to draw out key points regarding the capabilities and politico-military approaches of the different coalition constructions rather than as an end in themselves.

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The project consequently did not intend for the scenarios to be fully developed. They are derived in part from past crises, with similarities to the Balkans, Gulf War, and humanitarian operations in Somalia. A brief characterization of each crisis scenario follows, with more detailed descriptions, including characterizations of opposing forces, contained in Appendix B (page 65).

**Renewed ethnic conflict in South-eastern Europe.** A succession of serious incidents between opposing paramilitary forces on each side of the border between East and West states leads to the outbreak of military hostilities. East State forces succeed, at minor cost, in securing a contested area between the two countries in West State's Eastern Province, provoking significant movements of refugees. Internal ethnic confrontation flares up within West State. The basic ethnic homogeneity of Eastern province keeps it relatively protected from the civil unrest. Eastern Province has always kept close ethnic ties with East State. East State, with about 20 million inhabitants, is led by an authoritarian regime that has distanced itself from other Western countries. West State, with about 6 million inhabitants, has a democratic government. For this intervention, the working group evaluated low, medium and high-end variations of the scenario, depicting a gradation of possible difficulties the coalition might face. In the low-end variation, the coalition only had to deal with paramilitary activity. In the medium variation, the coalition faces some opposition from East State regular forces, and in the high end it faces large-scale opposition from those forces.

**Regional conflict in the Arabian Peninsula.** Subsequent to a radical change of political regime in East State, the new government has been discreetly supporting terrorist groups sharing a similar ideology. Political and military tension has also built up with West State, a moderate neighbor. The discovery of vast new oil resources in the contested border area between the two countries leads, after a very short period of heightened tension, to a surprise attack by East State conventional forces. Despite significant organized resistance put up by West State armed forces, East State succeeds in securing, in 48 hours, the northern portion of West State, including the oil-rich border area and littoral cities. An attempt to overthrow West State government by a small group of extremists is foiled but several terrorist actions are successfully conducted in the West State capital against public facilities.

**Humanitarian Crisis in the Horn of Africa.** The humanitarian situation in both North State and South State, located in the Horn of Africa, has become extremely precarious. Uncontrolled armed groups operating on each side of the border create additional concerns regarding the delivery of humanitarian assistance set up under UN and Organization of African Unity auspices. There is also growing concern in the U.S. and in Europe for the safety of a rather large oil and gas prospecting complex in the southwest of North State, well within reach of some uncontrolled armed groups. About 2000 U.S. and European nationals (30/70) work and live in the complex of one dozen prospecting sites and two main support bases.

## THE COALITION INTERVENTIONS IN 2005

Coalition military interventions begin with a common decision on the part of a group of countries to undertake a mission together. While this observation is self-evident, the ability to undertake timely politico-military decision-making in the pre-crisis phase of each scenario was a significant concern for all three coalition constructions. It was especially so for the two European-led ones. Because of the more limited capabilities that they could bring to bear on the crisis, these two coalitions viewed an early commitment of forces as a major factor in mission success. The greater sensitivity attached to intelligence sharing during the pre-crisis phase, when the national interests of potential coalition members are not yet fully engaged, can further complicate timely multinational decision-making. Once countries put “boots on the ground” a more focused convergence of interests takes place. Despite having more limited technical intelligence-gathering means compared to those of the U.S., the EU-autonomous coalition believed that for an intervention in Europe it would have sufficient understanding of the unfolding situation to make appropriate political and military decisions at the strategic level.

Avoiding the kind of transatlantic clash over politico-military options that took place during the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia is an important issue for the European-led coalition with U.S.-NATO support. During UNPROFOR operations from 1992–1995, the U.S. provided important support capabilities, including airpower, but did not have any forces at risk on the ground. The unequal sharing of risks

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helped contribute to divergent European and U.S. politico-military approaches to the Bosnian crisis, with Washington at times undermining EU policy.

Nonetheless, there would be important differences between what took place during UNPROFOR and an EU-led intervention with NATO/U.S. support. The U.S. would have taken a deliberate decision in the North Atlantic Council to have the EU lead the intervention, and the intervention would likely take place using the NATO command structure (see discussion below). Under these conditions, Washington probably would agree to contribute to an EU-led operation while allowing the EU control of crisis decision-making without undue involvement from the U.S. However, if the situation appeared to risk getting out of control, Washington would very probably want significant involvement in shaping policy towards the crisis out of concern that it would have to deepen its military engagement in order to rescue the EU intervention.

Effective intelligence preparation of the operational space and operational planning weighed heavily on mission success for all three coalitions. The U.S. would be able to provide large quantities of information to create very representative synthetic environments. However, in order for coalition countries fully to exploit this capability, there would need to be communications links with European headquarters possessing levels of security and bandwidth that will not be available in 2005. There is also a need for mission rehearsal capabilities.

All three of the project coalition constructions were capable of undertaking the 2005 Balkan peace enforcement intervention, but with varying degrees of difficulty attached. The three coalitions established similar political objectives for the intervention, seeking to bring about a near-term stabilization of the crisis, restore West State sovereignty over Eastern Province, and find long-term solutions to the conflict's root causes. The rapid deployment of initial entry ground forces into West State for crisis stabilization and deterrence of any further East State forward movement constituted a key element of the operational concept for all three coalitions, emphasizing the need to have a visible warfighting capability on the ground as quickly as possible. Following the rapid deployment of light infantry units, a medium-heavy weight force would flow in to provide a stronger reassurance and deterrence

presence. All three coalitions deployed a significant air strike force package.

However, coalition operational concepts diverged after this common approach to the initial stage of the intervention, with the first two coalitions, NATO-led and EU-led with NATO/U.S. support, taking a more coercive approach to the objective of bringing about a withdrawal of East State forces from the disputed border area. Both of these coalitions included in their force packages the assets and operational concepts for an early securing of the disputed border area, the use of targeted air and missile strikes to apply pressure on East State to withdraw, and the eventual use of offensive ground forces physically to drive out East State forces if necessary. Thus, for example, if East State did not withdraw from the disputed border area, the EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support would conduct a compellence campaign using air and missile attacks against East State sources of power and wealth of the leadership as well as tactical strikes on East States forces. The coalition would also use psychological operations and other measures to undermine East State will to remain in Eastern Province. If these efforts did not have the desired effect, the air and missile compellence campaign would switch to preparation of the battlefield in order physically to drive out East State forces.

The EU autonomous coalition approached the situation somewhat more cautiously, initially focusing on the near-term stabilization of the crisis by helping to restore internal security to West State and by deterring East State forces from moving into Eastern Province. Offensive military action was a longer-term potential option for the EU autonomous coalition, to be envisaged after a combination of diplomatic, economic, and defensive deployments would have marked the EU's determination to resolve the situation in Eastern Province, and probably requiring a further buildup of forces. The use of targeted air and missile strikes to apply pressure on East State to withdraw did not figure in the EU autonomous coalition's operational concept for the intervention.

Command structure limitations constitute one of the most important constraints on an EU-led operation for a 2005 Balkan-type peace enforcement operation, with the UK and France not yet ready at that point to provide a lead nation headquarters for a large, multinational operation with the potential to escalate up to high-intensity combat.

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If participation in the intervention were limited to a handful of the most militarily capable European countries, it would be feasible in 2005 to have a European command structure based on a lead nation headquarters provided by the UK or France, into which multinational elements would be integrated. In short, European deficiencies in the area of command arrangements, including situational assessment, planning, simulation, and secure communications, become more acute as an intervention climbs up the combat spectrum and adds an increasing number of participating countries. For example, in undertaking offensive operations to compel an East State withdrawal from the disputed border area, an EU autonomous coalition would have to deal with a shortfall in deployable C<sup>3</sup> modules.

Consequently, the European-led coalition with U.S.-NATO support would make use of the NATO command structure for a European peace enforcement mission in 2005. NATO's C<sup>2</sup> structure would dovetail into an EU operation through the role of the deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) as joint commander of the EU operation. The countries participating in the intervention would have to decide on the operational force commander.

Similar to the area of command arrangements, other European capability shortfalls in 2005 become much more significant as a peace enforcement operation moves up the combat spectrum in intensity. In a 2005 timeframe, European countries will have begun to deploy significant new stand-off precision strike assets. This capability enhancement will center around French and British deployment of Scalp-EG/Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles. The missile has a range of over 250 kilometers as well as one meter accuracy, with GPS guidance providing an all weather capability. Each country is procuring some 500 missiles. Germany, Italy, and Greece also plan to acquire air-launched cruise missiles. By 2005 France will start deploying a national all weather precision guided munition (PGM) that is functionally similar to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), with an expected procurement of over 700. The UK also has a program to acquire bombs fitted with Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance systems, while Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal are acquiring new modification kits for their F-16's that will enable them to fire JDAM's as well as other U.S. stand-off PGMs. The EU will thus have a good engagement capability in a 2005 timeframe, although an

enduring operation at the higher end of the crisis scenario would stress munitions stockpiles.

European surveillance and target acquisition capabilities will improve over the period from 2002–2006, as will strategic imagery collection. Nonetheless, overall theater and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as logistics, represent moderate shortfalls in the low-end peace enforcement operation, and acute ones at the high end.<sup>1</sup> Force projection capabilities (tactical and strategic lift, air refueling) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) are not European shortfalls at the low end of the peace enforcement scenario, but become significant ones at the high end. By 2004, however, the EU will also be able to deploy an adequate number of combat search and rescue (CSAR) teams for Petersberg missions. SEAD and CSAR are important capabilities at the high end of the scenario in order to minimize losses of aircraft and pilots.

These European capability shortfalls explain the relative caution with which the EU autonomous coalition approached the 2005 peace enforcement intervention by putting off to the longer term any potential coercive military action against East State. Known European limitations in terms of air refueling and SEAD could diminish the credibility of the air strike force package that the coalition would deploy to the region. If all or some of this force had to intervene, the potentially limited effectiveness of its intervention and/or significant losses due to the robust air defense capabilities of East State forces could have very adverse consequences on the evolution of the crisis.

The ability to draw on U.S. and NATO assets fills many, but not all European shortfalls for a Balkan type peace enforcement operation in 2005, at all levels of the scenario. As already seen in the above discussion, some of the 2005 European capability shortfalls are deficits rather than complete shortfalls, so the U.S. contribution would not need to be as substantial as would otherwise be the case. For example, even in an area such as SEAD, seen as a major European capability shortfall, the UK, Germany, and Italy all have some technological or operational capabilities. During the Kosovo campaign Germany flew 394 Tornado sorties for the suppression of Serbian air defenses, firing 244 high speed antiradiation missiles (HARM), but with the U.S. providing electronic jamming support aircraft for these missions.

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Assuming that they were not otherwise occupied, bandwidth on satellite communications, aerial refueling, lift, and ISR all constitute capabilities that the U.S. would probably be willing to provide to EU-led operations. The contribution of these capabilities provided an important boost to the ability of the EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support to undertake a coercive air and missile campaign against East State. It also provided greater confidence in the coalition's ability to protect ground forces deployed to secure the border area if East State did begin to withdraw. These forces could come under threat of attack if the situation subsequently deteriorated. However, if the EU were to need U.S. capabilities that involve "pulling the trigger," including cruise missiles, there could be a considerable question mark over the U.S. willingness to provide them. In such a circumstance, Washington would likely want to see the operation conducted under a command arrangement that would provide it with a more direct role in operational decision-making.

European use of the NATO command structure changes this capability area from an acute to moderate deficiency at the higher ends of the crisis scenario, with secure, interoperable communications remaining as a major problem. Although U.S. information systems can provide for ISR requirements at all levels of the scenario, C<sup>4</sup> connectivity issues will probably constrain to some extent the ways in which an EU-led coalition would be able to draw on those systems, with more limited scope for exploiting information in real-time. Force projection remains a partial deficiency at the high end of the scenario, as U.S. lift would need to be reconfigured for other countries' forces, while logistics at the multinational level remains a major shortfall at the scenario's high end.

Non-technical, strategic intelligence is a significant shortfall at the low end of the crisis scenario, even with U.S. support. The relative importance of this capability area declines as the intervention moves up the combat spectrum, but would regain importance in the post-combat phases of an intervention. Special operations forces (SOF) deployed early in theater would provide valuable information. European countries have SOF capability, although the procedures and philosophy behind their use varies greatly from country to country and there is reluctance to discuss how to improve the ability of national SOF to interoperate. During a crisis intervention, tactical intelligence sharing

between coalition participants is generally not a problem, but intelligence sharing at the operational and strategic levels is a major challenge, between the U.S. and European countries and within Europe as well. There is a strong need for more intelligence sharing and for the development of common procedures for doing so. National intelligence cells within multinational headquarters will probably always be needed because of the sensitivity of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Special forces in some ways present the same problem as intelligence capabilities. As militaries develop more specialized capabilities, gray areas on the borderline between special and conventional forces may emerge, such as, for example, a light infantry battalion operating in dispersed platoons. This trend may further complicate intelligence sharing issues.

The addition of U.S. capabilities is less critical to the 2005 EU-led humanitarian mission in the Horn of Africa than it is to the European peace enforcement intervention, but would nonetheless still be quite useful. European intelligence-gathering capabilities in the pre-crisis phase might be limited. The provision of U.S. satellite or other intelligence data would thus be beneficial to early intelligence gathering. The key U.S. contribution though would be in filling European military airlift capability shortages. The EU intervention force would consist of a light combat brigade to serve as a security and extraction force, a logistics brigade with military police, transport units and engineers to provide humanitarian support, and air and naval support assets. European shortfalls in airlift capability would delay deployment of the extraction force for a possible evacuation operation. Airlift shortfalls could also delay the timely control of initial points of entry for the main body of the humanitarian support force. Because of the need to rely on sea transport for the logistics brigade's heavy elements, the entire force could not be deployed in less than a month.

Secure, interoperable tactical communications between different elements of the EU intervention force may be lacking and could cause some problems. In the absence of permanent multinational command structures for the strategic or theater level, the EU autonomous coalition would of necessity rely on a lead nation concept or concept of lead nations (one lead nation for each level of command or functional responsibility). On the logistics side, current European plans call for the deployment of national logistics assets to support national contri-

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butions to the multinational force. Due to the extension of the lines of communications between Europe and the Horn of Africa, some consolidation in this domain would be very beneficial to the overall effectiveness of the force.

For the two interventions in which the United States is a full participant, the NATO-led peace enforcement operation and the regional conflict in the Middle East, U.S.-European cooperability issues replace shortfalls as the area of concern. The working group assumed that due to U.S. political constraints towards risk as well as to doctrinal differences in dealing with complex emergencies, European forces would provide the primary ground presence in the NATO-led coalition's undertaking of the peace enforcement operation. U.S. ground forces, consisting of one warfighting and one reconnaissance brigade, would be limited to a reserve role in West State, while a fully manned European division (France, Germany, UK) would deploy into Eastern Province. In light of this functional and geographic separation, potential C<sup>4</sup>ISR connectivity problems constitute the principal source of U.S.-European cooperability issues in the operation. In particular, the coalition would have the objective of integrating national C<sup>4</sup>ISR assets, together with concomitant data fusion capability, in order to provide a Common Operational Picture (COP) for all coalition partners. The working group established the further objective of establishing integrated sensor-to-shooter capability for U.S., UK, French, and German forces.

In the regional conflict scenario, the intervening coalition would potentially need to conduct overlapping combat, peace support, and humanitarian operations. The coalition's operational concept included the insertion of air mobile ground forces into unoccupied West State to prevent further occupation, assistance to the West State government with internal security, and acting as an advance party for the reinvasion forces. Coalition forces may need to oversee the distribution of food and tents to displaced persons within West State, in coordination with the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In addition to the deployment of sea mobile land forces to West State to prepare for the reinvasion of areas occupied by East State, the coalition would deploy additional land forces into West State that would act as an operational reserve in case the East State government collapsed, resulting in a breakdown of law and order or in civil war. This operational reserve

force would carry out a peace enforcement mission in the event of a partial or complete collapse of East State government authority.

Although the coalition's operational concept would potentially allow for functional separation of U.S. and European forces, the criteria that the working group established for European participation was for it to be significant, useful, and able to interoperate effectively with U.S. forces. Leading European countries participating in the intervention want to be able to influence the strategic response, the operational planning, and the outcome to a crisis. In order to do so, Europe needs to assume a reasonable proportion of burden sharing in terms of the risks involved in the intervention. The commitment of significant (and equivalent) European ground forces would go a long way towards achieving these objectives.

The participation of two European divisions would make a significant contribution to the ground force requirement for the campaign. However, European strategic lift shortfalls may impede the timely arrival of European forces into the theater, and once there tactical lift shortfalls may limit mobility. U.S.-European cooperability issues will be more problematic in the 2005 regional conflict scenario. C<sup>4</sup>ISR connectivity, standards and doctrinal issues will be more critical than for the peace enforcement intervention. Secure communications between U.S. and European forces at both the strategic and tactical level may be deficient, although this observation may also apply at the tactical level to U.S. joint forces. The lack of familiarity with NATO doctrine and procedures on the part of non-NATO assigned U.S. forces was the source of significant U.S.-European cooperability problems during the 1991 Gulf War, and would be so again in any future regional conflict operation unless measures are taken to address the issue.

European lack of combat identification increases the risk of friendly fire casualties in a high-tempo, high-intensity combat operation. U.S. and European close battle forces may experience difficulties operating together at a high level of effectiveness unless both are able to operate at the same tempo. European command integration is currently inadequate to the task of achieving this tempo regardless of the individual warfighting capabilities of European forces, and this situation could potentially worsen if measures are not taken to deal with it. Without resolution of these issues, it may be difficult for European forces to play a fully integrated role in the campaign.

## II. THE COALITION INTERVENTIONS

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Even if European forces were functionally separated from U.S. ones by taking the role of operational reserve to carry out the peace enforcement mission, the increasing pace of events in military operations as well as the impossibility of fully separating combat and peace enforcement operations would make it vital for the coalition to establish and maintain a common operational picture (COP). An outdated operational picture, or one that differed among the coalition partners, would be very likely to engender uncoordinated, potentially counter-productive actions by different elements of the coalition.

Among the three 2005 crisis scenarios, the regional conflict intervention is the one that presents the greatest challenges from asymmetric threats. An immediate non-military task of the intervention is to build as large an international political coalition as possible to work towards elimination of the terrorist network based in East State. Once combat operations begin, the coalition would insert special operations forces (SOF) into East State for counter-terrorist reconnaissance and denial missions. Multinational cooperability for SOF may not be a major problem if their missions are conducted independently, but it will be important to harmonize SOF activity with concurrent conventional operations. Both U.S. and European forces will have adequate defenses against chemical weapons attack, but neither are likely to possess satisfactory biological defense capabilities.

## THE STATE OF PLAY IN 2015

Substantial improvement in European military capabilities will take place between 2005 and 2015, *provided* currently planned projects are implemented. By 2015, the EU will have resolved its shortfalls in all capability areas to do with command arrangements if European nations deliver on their plans. The European force will have a European framework nation headquarters capable of deploying with significant improvements in information, C<sup>2</sup>, and secure communications, providing a multinational command structure able to function even in a very challenging peace enforcement scenario. However, adequate simulation capability will depend on the realization of unfunded aspirations, while in a regional conflict situation there may be bandwidth shortages for secure communications. This last observation applies to the United States as well as to Europe.

European ISR needs will progressively increase over the decade from 2005 to 2015, but European countries should be able to meet these needs due to digitization, new sensors, platforms, and data links. EU countries have considerable capability for theater surveillance and reconnaissance under development, and could potentially achieve a substantial filling-in of this shortfall by 2010. On the other hand, there are no projects currently planned to meet signals intelligence (SIGINT) requirements to provide operational warning of possible incursions in peace support interventions. Battle damage assessment (BDA) will probably remain a partial shortfall at the high end of a peace enforcement scenario. The EU will have resolved shortfalls in strategic and tactical lift as well as aerial refueling by 2015. Whereas in 2005 an EU mobile reserve would have to consist of armor, by 2008 EU countries will have a robust attack helicopter capability that could quickly self-deploy. This attack helicopter capability would provide a more credible heavy force element than in 2005, although it is not, nor will it be easy, to self-deploy short-range air assets.

European force protection capabilities will also undergo significant improvement between 2005 and 2015. In principle, European SEAD shortfalls should be filled, but there is uncertainty over whether funding will be maintained for planned projects. Several countries will deploy new extended air/missile defense systems based on the Aster interceptor, the Patriot PAC-3, and more speculatively the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), and there are also current projects for new generation individual and collective protection against chemical and biological weapons threats. However, there is some uncertainty over the maintaining of funding for the chemical and biological protection projects as well. Provided research and development are continued, the U.S. and European countries should be able to maintain adequate protection against chemical agents. Shortfalls could potentially remain in the area of biological protection for both the United States and European countries, even if research and development efforts are continued.

By 2015, the EU should thus possess highly effective capabilities to undertake autonomously both the humanitarian intervention in the Horn of Africa as well as the Balkan peace enforcement operation. In the 2015 peace enforcement scenario, if East State had chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, along with theater missiles, in-

## II. THE COALITION INTERVENTIONS

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formation and counter-information capabilities, the EU-led coalition could be vulnerable to various forms of asymmetric attack. These could include conventional and unconventional delivery of chemical, biological or radiological weapons, cyber-warfare (East State's ability to break information systems) as well as other forms of attack against national infrastructure. Such East State capabilities in 2015 would not necessarily constitute a showstopper for an EU-led intervention, given the capability improvements discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Nonetheless, the high end of the peace enforcement scenario could very possibly push East State towards chemical and biological use, with the latter more likely. If there were perceptions of a major threat to EU member territory an Article 5 situation would arise, and European countries would be likely to turn towards greater U.S. involvement even if they could handle the intervention in other respects.

The ability of European brigades to plug into a U.S.-led close battle operation in 2015 will be dependent on their providing meaningful military capability that can operate to a tempo determined by the U.S., for which C<sup>4</sup>ISR connectivity, doctrinal harmonization, and logistic support will be essential. The achievement of substantial progress in C<sup>4</sup> connectivity is also essential for U.S. and European deep battle forces to be able to operate together, although integration in the deep battle may not be particularly critical. Without common combat identification, European countries will be unable to undertake integrated combat operations with a U.S. transformed force. Coalition ISR requirements in a high-intensity regional conflict situation can only be satisfied through the establishment of a common operational picture and fused surveillance and reconnaissance data as well as a fused intelligence product.

European forces in a 2015 regional conflict operation may be dependent on the U.S. for missile defense requirements that go beyond extended air defense capabilities. If the U.S. has successfully developed and deployed advanced missile defense systems, it should be able to provide protection to coalition forces operating with its own in the theater of operations. However, U.S. systems may not be able to protect the homelands of European coalition members, if a threat to European territory were present. Without European investment in missile defense systems capable of covering national territory, protection of European homelands against long-range missile strikes would depend on two instruments, deterrence and counterforce, including possible

preemption of long-range missile threats prior to the onset of combat operations.

**NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>In the case of logistics, the shortfall applies to the multinational level rather than to countries taken separately. As an operation goes up the conflict spectrum, there are huge sovereignty and coordination problems at the multinational level.



### **III. CONCLUSIONS**

#### **CESDP AND TRANSATLANTIC COOPERABILITY**

**CESDP could help narrow existing operational gaps between U.S. and European forces.**

The almost complete convergence between CESDP and DCI requirements reflects the fact that the CESDP capabilities generation process is being driven in part by the realization that European countries need significant military assets to conduct the kinds of military operations foreseen by the EU, such as long distance rescue operations or forcible separation of combatants in a peace enforcement operation. Chapter two's analysis of the results of the interactive assessments for 2005 highlights the potential costs involved if the assets required for these missions are lacking.

Equally, if not more important, individual European nations aspire to maintain high intensity combat capability, and to a certain extent follow the U.S. in a shift to network-centric concepts if those concepts are proved to work. Through NATO concept development and experimentation, other multinational fora such as the Multinational Interoperability Council, and through bilateral relationships, European countries are attempting to stay in contact with U.S. concept, doctrinal, and organizational developments, as well as in various cases lead multinational efforts to explore transformational concepts and capabilities. As seen in chapter two, European militaries are gradually shifting their acquisition priorities to C<sup>4</sup>ISR integration, long-range precision strike, rapidly deployable joint strike forces, and unmanned vehicles. In a 2005 time frame, they will have begun to deploy significant new stand-off precision strike assets.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

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**In order to undertake autonomous interventions, European military operations will be based upon different concepts of operations than those used by the United States, but with proper attention these concepts should be compatible and capable of harmonization.**

European concepts of operation will be tailored to European experience, capabilities and force employment philosophy. Where U.S. concepts emphasize overwhelming force and force protection, European ones will seek military dominance, accepting higher (or different) political and military risks. European concepts will stem in part from a somewhat different force employment philosophy, but they will also evolve in part from the need to work around more limited capabilities, if not clear shortfalls. In autonomous operations European militaries will take a more flexible approach, with less reliance on “capital intensive” continuous real-time monitoring of the battle space and sensor-to-shooter links, and more reliance on “boots on the ground” approaches seeking fast initial entry of lighter forces in theater, mastering violence at the lowest possible level, and focusing on the control of terrain.

If some European capability shortfalls are satisfied through access to NATO and U.S. assets, European militaries should be able to adjust their operational concepts to make use of those assets as long as the U.S. and European countries are sufficiently engaged together in multinational training, exercising, and experimentation, including through maximum possible use of synthetic environments. U.S.-European C<sup>4</sup>ISR interoperability will be critical to European ability to exploit support from U.S. assets as well as to U.S.-European ability to operate effectively together on the battlefield (it will also allow the U.S. to exploit in a timely way complementary information from European sources and assets). In this project, the EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support used an operational concept for the peace enforcement intervention not much different from that of the NATO-led coalition.

The U.S. also has major responsibilities in helping to ensure U.S.-European cooperability in a post-transformation world, notably through technology transfer reform, and seeking cooperative solutions to technical connectivity issues. European purchase of U.S. systems or subsystems will undoubtedly constitute a preferred solution in some capability areas, but the U.S. must bear in mind that a vigorous European defense industry is critical to maintaining and increasing European defense

## EUROPEAN INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES

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spending. A greatly enhanced European ability selectively to incorporate U.S. technology into their own systems has a critical role to play in helping European countries address capability shortfalls and maintain coalition effectiveness with the United States.

**A “division of labor” approach to coalition operations would constitute a flawed and counterproductive operational solution to the failure to address transatlantic cooperability issues.**

Failure to resolve the connectivity, standards, and doctrinal issues that were identified in the last chapter would seal a rigid division of labor approach to coalition operations. The project’s regional conflict interactive assessment illustrates the operational shortcomings to such an outcome. Even if the only role for European forces was to constitute the operational reserve force that would carry out the peace enforcement mission in the event of a partial or complete collapse of East State government authority, it would still require high levels of U.S.-European cooperability, especially C<sup>4</sup>ISR integration and doctrinal harmonization. The absence of this cooperability would constitute a severe handicap to operational effectiveness and mission success, despite the functional division of labor between U.S. and European forces

## EUROPEAN INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES

**In a 2005 timeframe, the EU, or a more limited coalition of the most militarily capable EU nations, will be able to carry out a range of autonomous operations from humanitarian intervention at considerable distance, up to and including highly challenging European peace enforcement operations by adapting mission objectives and operational concepts to available capabilities.**

To some extent EU-led coalitions could work around capability shortfalls by adopting more limited mission objectives as well as different operational concepts for the intervention. For example, flying in low would be an option, albeit a very risky one, for a European-led air campaign operating without secure communications or adequate stocks

### III. CONCLUSIONS

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of stand-off precision munitions. However, while different 2005 capability shortfalls will not militarily prevent European countries from undertaking humanitarian and peace enforcement interventions, they could result in operational difficulties that will potentially reduce or even undermine perceptions of mission success. This type of outcome could occur, for example (using the project scenarios), if:

- the length of time required for deployment in Horn of Africa humanitarian intervention results in casualties to foreign nationals or in large number of deaths among displaced populations before aid can be delivered; or
- in the peace enforcement intervention, widespread ethnic cleansing takes place in Eastern Province before EU forces can build up in West State to sufficient strength to undertake offensive operations.

The potential for escalation from low to high intensity operations in peace support interventions means that high levels of risk, including of increased casualties, could characterize EU/European autonomous operations in these interventions, to the extent that policymakers might well prove unwilling to undertake them. EU autonomous interventions in 2005 may not be able to achieve coercive actions in short delays with a favorable balance of forces. Thus, an EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support and then a NATO-led coalition could bring about a considerable, progressive decrease in the level of risk in undertaking these 2005 interventions, or modify the nature of these risks in ways that could make them more acceptable to political leaders.

**Depending on the successful implementation of planned capability improvements, by 2015 European countries should be able autonomously to conduct humanitarian support interventions at considerable distance, as well as challenging European peace support interventions, at lower levels of political and military risk, including less risk to perceptions of mission success.**

It should then be possible for European countries to contribute substantial joint capabilities to a U.S.-led regional conflict intervention, in particular a major share of the ground component. This contribution

will allow them to influence the intended outcome of the engagement. European countries could provide approximately half of the ground force requirement of a combined arms corps, consisting of two U.S. divisions (transformation forces in 2015) and two European divisions. These European divisions would be able to interoperate both technically and doctrinally with U.S. forces, depending upon the implementation of planned European projects and the resolution of U.S.-European connectivity, standards, and doctrinal issues.

**The implementation of all currently planned capability improvements will require additional European defense expenditures.**

This observation stems from the increased number of operations and the consequently larger share of defense budgets devoted to operations, the high states of readiness needed for crisis management capabilities, future potential homeland defense needs, and of course the cost of the planned projects themselves. Nonetheless, in order to achieve significantly enhanced intervention capabilities in a 2015 horizon, the key issue for Europeans is not to add major new capability improvements to current defense plans, but rather to implement to the greatest extent possible (and as quickly as possible for the most urgently need capabilities) projects that are already in those plans.

This conclusion places the defense budgetary issue in proper perspective. It is not necessary for Europeans to undertake a major defense buildup in order to address military requirements in a meaningful way. Even modest real increases in spending could potentially have a major impact, especially if coupled with other measures such as refocusing defense budgets to place greater emphasis on acquisition and achieving increased synergies in EU defense spending through role sharing and specialization. In exchange, the filling in of capability shortfalls will bring enormous benefits by providing European countries with a much broader range of force projection options. European-led interventions will have greater chances of mission success, reduced casualties, and shorter duration operations. Participating in U.S.-led coalitions, Europeans will be able to make a much more significant contribution, with concomitant gains in influence.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

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**As well as providing adequate funding for capability improvements, European countries could also greatly strengthen European and transatlantic coalition effectiveness by creating a joint European “spearhead force.”**

One highly important factor in assessing a useful European contribution to coalition operations is the effect of prompt arrival of appropriate military capability on shaping the development of a crisis. As discussed in chapter two, the ability for rapid deployment of initial entry forces would be an extremely valuable option for effective intervention in all three of the assessed crises, regardless of coalition construction. A second factor in a U.S.-led coalition operation is the degree to which this capability will influence the decision-making of the U.S. strategic and operational leadership in its planning and execution. It is clearly part of the bargain in any coalition operation that significant military capability at useful levels of readiness should have proportionate influence in the ways and means of securing common policy objectives.

To this end, the creation of a joint European “spearhead force” of land, sea and air elements that could be at high readiness for deployment in response to developing crises arguably constitutes a matter for urgent consideration. Some individual European nations already have high-readiness elements of their expeditionary capability. One component of the spearhead force would be these national forces, which would be earmarked for European operations and their readiness levels declared to Europe. Indeed it is likely that in the short to medium term only a limited number of European nations would be able to generate the appropriate capabilities at adequate readiness.

A second component might be high-readiness elements of existing multinational European formations, such as the EuroCorps as well as standing multinational maritime and air formations. In the short to medium term, though, it would not be sufficient to rely on the development of a truly multinational capability to meet the total spearhead force requirement. Multinational operations are likely to remain coalitions of the willing and a standing multinational formation’s availability is likely to be dependent on the commitment of the individual contributing nations. The total spearhead force concept is likely therefore to comprise a number of national and multinational force elements.

**Mere earmarking of forces would not, however, give the concept sufficient substance.**

If such a force were established, it would need to be a planning assumption that the spearhead force would deploy in the early stages if there was to be European involvement on a significant scale in a particular future coalition operation. It must also be viable when only a proportion of EU nations have decided to commit forces to an operation, and some features would therefore need to be available regardless of the European mix in the coalition. These would include: a mobile expeditionary headquarters capable of deploying autonomously into theater; communications and information systems both to provide command and control of the force and to be interoperable with the headquarters of U.S. high-readiness formations; lift and logistic support at sufficient readiness and a guarantee of availability.

There are a number of force elements from various nations and standing multinational forces that could comprise a spearhead force for a particular operation. Similarly, in the short to medium term the precise mobile expeditionary headquarters structure and command will vary from operation to operation. It would be important, therefore, to be able to secure institutional experience and behavioral interoperability in any particular spearhead force headquarters composition. One solution would be to for the EU to form a small, permanent cadre multinational staff that would be spliced onto the candidate national expeditionary headquarters and any future high-readiness multinational headquarters for specific exercises and operations. It would be most important that the spearhead force and various headquarters options should be regularly exercised, and given priority in multinational exercise programs, to ensure that the package of national or multinational high-readiness headquarters plus standing cadre would be available and operationally ready within the readiness of the lead units of the spearhead force. When not employed on operations or exercises the cadre staff would have a useful role in operational level contingency planning and in developing procedures in support of the EU Military Staff.

Capability would need to be meaningful and significant in comparison with U.S. capability aspirations in terms of scale of effort and deployment timelines. Further study would be needed to establish the optimum scale and capabilities. An illustrative force might have a ground component of brigade size with lead elements deployable

### **III. CONCLUSIONS**

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in 72 hours. Key capabilities are likely to be special forces, specialist ground forces such as the marine and airborne forces of some European nations, airborne ISR and air maneuver forces, and naval land attack forces and command platforms.

Such a force would not have a role that was in competition with any high-readiness NATO formations. Indeed proposals are under consideration to establish a NATO joint spearhead force. It would clearly be important for the planning of both capabilities to be taken forward together, as high-readiness national and multinational formations and units would very likely be double-hatted to both forces. Unnecessary duplication between standing or cadre elements of the two proposed multinational headquarters should be avoided. The fundamental objective would be to have a European joint spearhead capability that could operate without U.S. participation as well as alongside U.S. forces both within or outside NATO.

It should therefore be possible for the European spearhead force to come under the control of a NATO commander in an operation in which NATO command is at some stage established. Similarly, the EU spearhead force might integrate with U.S. spearhead forces in a non-NATO operation at some stage where it makes operational sense to do so. Furthermore, NATO and EU force planning processes will hopefully reach a degree of harmonization such that national assignment of forces where relevant would meet both organizations' needs without conflict. For both EU and NATO spearhead forces to be fully effective to the necessary degrees of flexibility, it will be most important that the chosen command options and cadre standing headquarters staffs are exercised regularly and imaginatively, and that ample experimentation using synthetic environments takes place. Major exercises could be designed in which the U.S. reinforced a European initiative, and vice versa, and in which forces could be transferred between NATO and EU command or the command itself could undergo metamorphosis from one to the other.

### **POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERFACES**

War is the pursuit of policy or political ends by the application of force. The conduct of military operations requires a complex planning process, involving not only military-technical subjects but also the

injection of diplomatic, legal and political issues. This is the politico-military process. Each major power has its own processes, influenced by history, constitutional arrangements and the nature of the military activity in which it is likely to engage. NATO itself has its own practices and processes, affected by and affecting the processes of its members. The EU has just begun developing its own.

Coalition and Alliance operations are particularly complex because the processes have to take place within the coalition, between the coalition and its members, and between the members themselves. They may also involve other actors such as the UN, interested powers, and so on. Operations involving the EU and NATO will obviously add further layers of complexity, not only between the two organizations but in national capitals where the machinery for giving instructions to the one may not be the same as for the other.

Politico-military processes may cover both immediate operational issues (the development of the battle or operation), but also such medium term and longer term questions as force planning and arms control. They also cover the spectrum of levels of operations from tactical to strategic. In the past the main emphasis was on the last level, but many operations now involve much closer links between units on the ground and the overall political or policy objective. Links at the unit level with NGOs, allies or other actors may also be crucial to the success of a mission. Politico-military activity must, therefore, cover a wide range of activity, at many levels, and more or less continuously.

**For successful operations in the future, of whatever sort, it will be essential for the EU, NATO and individual countries to develop effective arrangements, embracing both institutions and processes, to enable multi-level and multi-actor consultations to take place.**

There have already been significant tensions between actors in recent military operations, for example in the Balkans. The development of communications will facilitate multi-level and multi-actor consultations, but also complicate them. There will be a risk of overload of the principal actors; there will be problems generated by speedy communications themselves – the CNN factor and the desire of political leaders to intervene.

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A particular area of difficulty will be the tensions which will prevent there being in most multinational operations one simple chain of command of the classic sort. Each country will seek a voice, not only in the strategic objective but in the day-to-day use of its forces and in reactions to events, good or bad. Politico-military activity will, therefore, often include not just work in capitals but in deployed commands.

In theory, matters would be simplified if all participants in a coalition had the same institutions and machinery for consultation and policy formation. However, they do not, and there is little prospect of total assimilation. Nevertheless, it may be possible for the major European players to develop systems and processes which are not too dissimilar. They may provide a template for the smaller European players. That would enable some simplification and reduce the most important inter-state liaison question to the interface with U.S. processes. Although NATO already has a body of practice, it will experience increased decision-making problems from enlargement. NATO's main difficulties will thus stem from the requirement for unanimity as well as from the need to refocus machinery appropriate for dealing with the Third World War to that suitable for a wide variety of missions ranging from humanitarian relief to high-intensity conflict.

The EU is likely to experience problems in bringing to bear the full range of tools which it should theoretically command. The Union is not a state actor like the U.S. It is a unique form of international organization, partly supra-national, partly intergovernmental, with a constitution that is still evolving. Defense and some foreign policy is in the Second Pillar, run by the Council. Many tools fall into the First Pillar, under the Commission's responsibility. There are major problems in the formulation of coherent policy in the Council of the European Union, and in the European Commission, and no easy way of making for coherence between them. Matters may be improved by the current studies under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, but there is no guarantee of that, certainly for the next few years. Thus the EU will be faced with grave problems in formulating policy and injecting policy and political guidance into military planning and command processes. That will be a particular source of problems in liaison with the U.S.

**Moreover, as highlighted in chapter two, it will be extremely important for a European-led operation to take timely politico-military decisions.**

In principle, the nascent EU structure offers more flexibility through “constructive abstention” for decisions requiring unanimity. Implementing joint actions can also be decided through “qualified majority” vote. Under current rules though, the qualified majority implies the agreement of at least ten of the current fifteen EU members and by and large the agreement of UK, France, Germany and Italy (with 10 votes each where current 15 EU countries have a total of 87 votes, of which 62 represent the qualified majority). This situation will become even more complex as EU expands as well as NATO. The EU mechanisms still need to be exercised and to demonstrate their worthiness.

**Effective politico-military decision-making is likely to rely increasingly on framework nation structures and political leadership from major contributing nations.**

Ideally, the politico-military decision-making process at multinational level would provide for some kind of continuing process to anticipate crises, as well as maintain a continuing program of education, training, and exercising of politico-military processes. If there is a need to bring in armed force to deal with a crisis, the use of that instrument should be apparent quickly in order to contain the crisis at the lowest possible level.

An effective politico-military decision process needs to integrate political, economic, and military planning, ensuring that short-term tactics are coherent with long-term objectives. The need for more sophisticated politico-military processes that can take into account burgeoning levels of complexity, coupled with the increased decision-making difficulties both NATO and the EU are likely to encounter as they enlarge, points towards an important role for framework nation structures and political leadership from major contributing nations.

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## THE CONTINUING NEED FOR EFFECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC COALITIONS

**The working group's evaluations of the coalition interventions in the project crisis scenarios underscore the enduring nature of U.S.-European military interdependence.**

While the U.S. may be able to win wars without military contributions from other countries beyond in-theater basing rights, it is unlikely in many crises to be able to win the peace without military (and non-military) assistance from European allies, whether those crises occur within or outside Europe. In the project's regional conflict intervention, deployment of a reserve force ready to assume peace enforcement responsibilities constituted a major element in the U.S.-led coalition's operational concept. If Washington has to provide unilaterally all force elements needed for ultimate mission success in every military intervention it undertakes, even the United States' vast military resources are likely to buckle under the strain. The project work confirms the judgement expressed in chapter one that European forces able to operate effectively with U.S. ones across the spectrum of military operations offer substantial military as well as political benefit to the United States. Conversely, even if one makes optimistic assumptions regarding enhancements to European military capabilities during the next decade, European-led operations will benefit from the option of calling for U.S. support given the potential evolution of opposing forces' capabilities.

**If European countries succeed in strengthening their intervention capabilities in the ways discussed above, EU involvement in many types of military interventions could bring important gains to transatlantic security.**

An EU-led coalition should present advantages in terms of achieving a smoother transition from the coercive or combat phase of peace support operations to that of long-term stabilization efforts, since it can deploy full-spectrum capabilities for that purpose. However, in order most effectively to exploit its possession of these capabilities, including police, judicial, and economic instruments, the EU should attempt to improve the organizational cohesion between the roles and

## THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC COALITIONS

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responsibilities of the high representative for the common foreign and security policy and the commissioner for external affairs. The EU is currently working on the creation of a constabulary force, but the establishment of its rules of engagement represents a major challenge to work out.

**Allied countries could greatly benefit from the building of a strong “coalition culture,” meaning awareness of the characteristics of effective coalitions and a commitment to provide coalitions with those characteristics.**

NATO’s continuing evolution from an Alliance that gave member countries pre-defined roles against a fixed threat to one that must prepare responses to a wide range of potential crises without knowing in advance the players and their specific roles, the development of CESDP, the acute challenges present in the international security environment, and the difficulty attached to achieving the necessary level of cooperability, all point towards the need to build a strong coalition culture. The characteristics of effective coalitions include reaching agreement on the political and military objectives of an operation, reaching agreement on the philosophy of the intervention, risk sharing, joint training of likely coalition partners, mutual trust among principal coalition partners, commitment to completion of task, conducting operations with harmonized doctrine and technical connectivity, and post-mission evaluation of “lessons learned.” Effective coalitions are able to come together quickly, based upon substantial contingency planning, training, and political-military discussions prior to the outbreak of crises.

The project recommendations focus on how the U.S. and European countries can better address these issues. While many of the recommendations require long-term implementation, others are designed for more immediate impact. There is an urgent need for near-term measures that can enhance NATO and European military credibility in Washington, and that can underscore as well the continued importance that the U.S. attaches to having militarily capable allies. The risk exists that a downward spiral in the transatlantic military relationship could take place due to the interaction between insufficient European defense efforts and perceived U.S. disinterest in the Europeans as military allies. Perceptions in Europe that the U.S. is “writing off” the allies as military

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partners could significantly decrease the prospects for implementation of currently planned European capability improvements.

Maintaining and enhancing U.S.-European coalition effectiveness over the coming decade will take a major effort of political will on both sides of the Atlantic; in Europe to produce the necessary capabilities, and in the U.S. to overcome entrenched bureaucratic and political opposition towards necessary measures, in particular technology transfer reform. The rewards for success could be high – so could the cost of failure.

## **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION FOR IMPROVED TRANSATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN-LED COALITIONS**

The project findings and conclusions have stressed the need to improve the setting up as well as the functioning of both future transatlantic and European-led coalitions. In order to do so, a critical first step is for the U.S. and European countries to build a strong coalition culture as a foundation on which more effective coalitions can be based. A strong coalition culture possesses an awareness of the characteristics of successful coalitions and a commitment to work towards providing coalitions with those characteristics. Beyond the prevalence of a strong coalition culture in key countries, the ability to undertake timely politico-military decision-making constitutes a second fundamental requirement for effective coalitions. Two key approaches for enhancing coalition decision-making consist of intensified politico-military exercising and more effective multinational involvement in contingency planning.

To establish a foundation for improved transatlantic and European-led coalitions, the U.S. and European countries should:

- Issue a “coalition capabilities declaration,” whereby they undertake to give a high priority to the requirements of coalition operations in defense policy, planning and acquisition decisions. On the part of the U.S. this declaration would constitute an initial step towards implementation of JCS Chairman General Myers’ statements on the need to design weapons and weapons systems with joint and coalition interoperability in mind, as well as towards the call in the QDR for the creation of a joint and combined C<sup>4</sup>ISR architecture. On the part of EU members, the declaration would reaffirm that as CESDP moves forward, they

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will continue to take into account coalition needs at the transatlantic level. The declaration would also stress the commitment of NATO member states to NATO's continuing transformation from an alliance that gave member countries pre-defined roles against a fixed threat into a flexible instrument that can facilitate the establishment of effective coalitions to deal with a wide range of contingencies.

- Undertake increased levels of multinational military exchange, including the strengthening of ties in military doctrine centers, joint and service schools, increased numbers of coalition assignments, taking coalition "skills" (such as foreign language ability) into account in promotion boards, and increasing military postings in other countries.
- Host permanent allied exchange and liaison officers at key national headquarters responsible for contingency planning of operations likely to involve transatlantic or European-led coalitions. Examples of such headquarters are U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, UK Permanent Joint Headquarters, France's *État-major de force et d'entraînement interarmées*, and Germany's *Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr* (Bundeswehr operations command). Countries need to address existing obstacles that unnecessarily restrict communication with allied liaison officers present in national headquarters. Although likely framework nations all carry out contingency planning on a national basis, contingency planning must have multinational involvement as well if coalitions are to act quickly.
- Increase substantially politico-military exchanges and exercising among key, potential contributing nations, NATO, and the EU, encompassing the full range of potential coalition constructions and new mission scenarios. Politico-military decision-making processes need exercising to achieve a high level of efficiency. Intensified exercising of politico-military decision-making should produce a significant payoff in the ability to set up and carry out coalition interventions, especially in light of the likely need to use ad hoc framework nation structures. The habit of working together developed by exercising politico-military links in generic interventions will improve ad hoc politico-military arrangements

by helping to develop better procedures and corresponding capabilities, by allowing for better mutual understanding of various national particularities and concerns, and by strengthening common perceptions of international security challenges.

- Set up independent, multinational assessments to evaluate “lessons learned” from coalition operations, including cooperability issues, political-military decision-making, and the role of national contributions. Lessons learned evaluations have typically followed the completion of coalition operations. In terms of the requirements for effective coalitions, these exercises have often constituted “lessons catalogued and shelved” rather than learned. Countries have also drawn different, and sometimes conflicting lessons, from the same coalition operation. An independent, multinational assessment could help form a common understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of given coalition interventions. The intervention in Afghanistan has witnessed a high degree of cooperation among coalition countries in particular aspects of military operations, and could serve as one object of such an assessment.

## ENHANCING NATO'S ROLE AS COALITION FACILITATOR

NATO member states must ensure that NATO remains the essential foundation for allied military cooperation. It has the facility (integrated command structure), common standards, procedures, and experience to help grow the coalition culture in Europe (including the wider Europe) and at the transatlantic level. Its role should increasingly be as a facilitator of coalition operations, whether NATO-led, EU-led or ad hoc. As stated in the *Coalition Capabilities Declaration*, NATO's command and force structure, planning, doctrine, and procedures should evolve to enable the organization best to fulfill this new role of coalition facilitator for the range of missions resulting from the new strategic environment, including the war on terrorism.

To enhance its crucial role as a facilitator of coalition operations, NATO should:

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- Establish that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), or any successor command, have among their key responsibilities to serve as coalition construction facilitators, points of contact between military allies, and coordinators of member state and partner contributions to coalition operations.
- Task SACLANT or any successor command to act as a key point of contact between European NATO militaries and the U.S. based military, in particular with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) on force transformation and network-centric concept development. This new functional responsibility of SACLANT would substantially expand on its current role as the implementing agency for allied concept development and experimentation. The functional liaison role would help to ensure that European armed forces stay in contact with future U.S. military developments, would provide a focal point for European input to the U.S. force transformation process, and would begin to address the very serious cooperability issues between European NATO militaries and non-NATO assigned U.S. forces. Consistent with this new functional responsibility, and to reflect Europe's increasing assumption of burdens and responsibilities, at some point in the future the Allies may wish to consider appointing a European officer as SACLANT.
- Continue to evolve SHAPE contingency planning to reflect potential future missions of transatlantic and European-led coalitions and thereby play an invaluable role in multinational contingency planning
- Continue to adapt the CJTF concept to provide another means for NATO to give greater effect to the changing strategic environment, including NATO's role in the war against terrorism. The CJTF concept could help develop the knowledge and experience to support the construction of coalition capabilities for specific counter-terrorist tasks by, for example, exercising a framework command structure for operations against a significant terrorist target.

## EVOLVING EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES FOR FUTURE COALITION OPERATIONS

The work undertaken in this project shows that many European defense ministries have identified the capability improvements required to strengthen Europe's ability to undertake its own military missions as well as to contribute more effectively to transatlantic operations. As discussed in chapters two and three of this report, European implementation of current projects together with capability improvements that are already written into long-term defense plans will greatly strengthen European intervention capabilities across a wide range of scenarios and coalition constructions. However, implementation of current and planned capability improvements requires national governments to commit a sustained level of resources to defense. Europe's critical need is to define a long-term financial resource policy for defense, coordinated and optimized between European countries. It is widely accepted that ECAP and any new NATO capabilities initiative should be mutually reinforcing to the greatest possible extent. Based on the work performed for this project, endorsement of a European "spearhead force" concept as well as priority funding for capabilities that are critical for all three project coalition constructions will produce very high value payoffs for defense resources, greatly strengthening both transatlantic and European coalition effectiveness.

To strengthen the contribution of European nations to both transatlantic and European coalitions, European nations should:

- Adapt existing national and multinational units to establish an EU "spearhead force" of land, sea and air elements possessing specialist capabilities that would contribute to seizing the initiative in the early stages of an intervention whether in the company of U.S. forces or as the advance force of a EU operation. The force should be at high readiness for deployment in response to developing crises. The size of this force should be significant in comparison with high readiness U.S. expeditionary forces and levels of readiness should equate to those of similar U.S. forces. The force would meet the needs of both the EU and NATO, and could come under the control of a NATO commander in a NATO operation.

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- Focus on digitized C<sup>4</sup> and lift as the most urgent capability improvements for greatly strengthening the effectiveness of U.S.-led coalitions, European-led coalitions with NATO/U.S. support, and autonomous European coalitions. Implement reliable, interim airlift solutions to guarantee necessary capability on short notice in time of crisis or conflict, until European forces acquire an effective long-range transport capability.
- Further develop ISR capabilities as an urgent area for capability improvements in order to ensure their availability for European operations, including situations where U.S. assets are otherwise engaged, as well as to provide the necessary complementarity in a U.S.-EU engagement. While European countries have already programmed the deployment of significant new ISR capabilities in the next 3 to 5 years, ISR assets are always in high demand and contribute to greater trust, cohesion, and operational effectiveness among coalition partners. All weather precision strike, another key capability area, arguably constitutes a somewhat lower priority given the capability improvements that European countries will already be deploying in the next 3 to 5 years. Nonetheless, ensuring adequate stocks of weapons will always be an issue. NBC defense is also important, but is based on smaller programs and represents less of a funding challenge.

## **STRENGTHENING COOPERABILITY BETWEEN COALITION COUNTRIES**

A fundamental aspect of this project was to assess the potential European contribution to future transatlantic coalition operations. The EU must encourage all member nations to contribute a meaningful capability. Larger nations may aspire to providing balanced forces across the range of capabilities whereas smaller nations may seek to provide specialized capabilities. Nations may indeed specialize to the extent that some may focus on expeditionary or intervention capability while others may concentrate on capability for a follow-on presence. There are bound to be different tiers of European capability and interoperability. The key to successful European participation in coalition operation will be to have useful roles for all participating nations and

to field the most inclusive force. However the EU should aspire to an effective high-tempo intervention capability at the pace of its most rather than least capable members.

Two specific recommendations for strengthening cooperability between coalition countries are:

- The U.S. and European countries having the capability to act as “lead” or “framework” nations should engage in experimentation aimed at identifying and addressing the real issues of differences in U.S. and European doctrine and tempo as U.S. forces proceed with “transformation” and the adoption of network-centric concepts. The U.S. and the major European powers must focus more than ever on the goal of being able to interoperate both technically and doctrinally in high-intensity combat. These activities should also consider the levels of granularity, particularly for ground forces, at which it is necessary to achieve U.S.-European and intra-European doctrinal and technical interoperability. Certain types of forces, for instance special forces, will need to be interoperable at higher levels of granularity than others. High levels of interoperability between smaller national units of coalition forces is also a useful force-multiplier in peace support and stabilization operations and in difficult environments such as urban terrain.
- Other European countries with important specialized capabilities should be encouraged to develop them and ensure that they can plug into U.S. or European-led operations. Common standards/procedures, language training, and secure, interoperable communications are vital.

In order to facilitate greater transatlantic coalition effectiveness and European defense improvements, it is absolutely vital that governments continue to alleviate restrictions on the transatlantic flow of technology as well as to work towards a more open transatlantic defense market. Specific recommendations on technology transfer and defense industrial cooperation are beyond the scope of this project, but without reform in these areas governments will not be able to achieve many critical objectives related to transatlantic coalition effectiveness

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and European defense improvements. For example, it is virtually inconceivable that U.S. and European countries will be able to build a joint and combined C<sup>4</sup>ISR architecture, as called for in the U.S. QDR, without such reforms. The *Coalition Capabilities Declaration* set out in the first recommendation of this report could constitute an important “political spearhead” to push this effort forward.

# APPENDIX A

## Project Methodology

### A SCENARIO-BASED METHODOLOGY

This appendix describes the methodology that the project used in exploring how CESDP could affect the operational concepts, force composition, and military capabilities of future NATO and EU coalition operations. The project first developed three illustrative crisis scenarios: renewed ethnic conflict in Southeastern Europe, interstate conflict in the Arabian peninsula, and a humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. The project designed the crisis scenarios as a tool to draw out key points regarding the political and military approaches and the capabilities of the different coalition constructions rather than as an end in themselves. The project consequently did not intend for the scenarios to be fully developed or realistic. They are derived in part from past crises, with similarities to the Balkans, Gulf War, and humanitarian operations in Somalia. A description of the crisis scenarios is given in Appendix B (page 65).

	<b>Crisis scenario #1</b> Renewed ethnic conflict in South-eastern Europe	<b>Crisis scenario #2</b> Regional conflict in the Arabian Peninsula	<b>Crisis scenario #3</b> Humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa
NATO/U.S.-led Coalition	Peace enforcement intervention	High intensity combat operations	N/A
EU-led with NATO/U.S. support	Peace enforcement intervention	N/A	Rescue and humanitarian support
EU autonomous	Peace enforcement intervention	N/A	Rescue and humanitarian support

Table A.1: Scenario Matrix

The crisis scenarios provided the basis for examining a Balkan type peace enforcement, Middle East regional conflict, and Horn of Africa humanitarian intervention through the prism of three coalition constructions: NATO/U.S.-led, EU-led with NATO/U.S. support, and

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EU autonomous. Table A.1 (page 57) provides a matrix of the coalition constructions, crisis scenarios and interventions that the project working group examined.

The working group felt that U.S. or NATO leadership of a humanitarian operation in the Horn of Africa was politically less likely than that of the two EU-led coalition constructions, so the NATO/U.S.-led coalition construction did not undertake the intervention. The working group also decided that given projected defense capabilities, the two EU-led coalitions were unlikely to undertake a major regional conflict intervention in either a 2005 or 2015 time frame, and therefore did not evaluate this eventuality.

The working group carried out its assessments in two time periods, 2005 and 2015. The 2005 evaluation used an opposing forces baseline description and foreseen coalition capabilities in the same time frame. The project performed a second evaluation assuming the crisis unfolded in 2015, using updated opposing forces capabilities and projected coalition means for that period. The intervention scenarios took into account terrorist and other asymmetric threats.

### **AN ITERATIVE, ANALYTICAL PROCESS**

The project held an international planning meeting in May 2001, followed by a series of four full meetings that took place between November 2001 and June 2002. The project meetings included plenary working group and subgroup sessions. The three coalition constructions provided the basis for breaking the working group into subgroups. Membership of the subgroups (NATO/U.S., EU with NATO/U.S. support and EU autonomous) reflected to some extent the U.S. and European make-up of the coalition forces in the different scenarios, but U.S. members also participated in the EU autonomous scenarios. Frequent interim reports, as well as discussions during plenary sessions, served to compare and coordinate the work of the subgroups, and ultimately to combine that work towards this final report.

All subgroups assessed in an iterative manner the various political and military factors relevant to their intervention scenarios, in the two project time frames of 2005 and 2015. This iterative, analytical process consisted of the following steps:

1. Refinement of the crisis situations;

## AN ITERATIVE, ANALYTICAL PROCESS

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2. Identification of near and long-term political objectives;
3. Identification of military or other tasks required to meet the defined political objectives;
4. Identification of relevant military and non-military capabilities, and their availability to the intervening coalition;
5. Development of concepts of operations;
6. Conduct of “interactive assessments” of coalition interventions.

As depicted in the scenario matrix table A.1 (page 57), each coalition construction conducted two types of crisis interventions. The EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support only took a cursory look at the humanitarian intervention in the Horn of Africa since the addition of that support did not have a significant impact on how an EU-led coalition would conduct the intervention. A description of each of the six steps listed above follows:

1. **Refinement of the crisis situations.** Project staff provided initial descriptions of the crisis situations. The working group, at plenary session and subgroup levels, reviewed the descriptions and suggested variations or additional details, commensurate with the scope of the project, to improve their interest and usefulness. Final descriptions of the crisis situations are provided in Appendix B (page 65).
2. **Identification of near and long-term political objectives.** Following a first cut at refining the crisis situations, the subgroups developed a set of near and long-term political objectives for each intervention. Political constraints were also taken into consideration.
3. **Military or other tasks required to attain political objectives.** The subgroups reviewed in general terms the relevant military and non-military tasks that the coalition could undertake to attain identified political objectives. As a starting point, they used the following typology of military tasks:
  - conduct intelligence collection, processing and dissemination;

## **APPENDIX A. PROJECT METHODOLOGY**

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- assess situation;
  - support conflict prevention (e.g. through C<sup>4</sup>ISR activities);
  - plan operations;
  - ensure command and control of military operations;
  - liaise with appropriate non-military actors;
  - conduct information operations;
  - conduct psychological operations;
  - deploy forces (strategic and theater/tactical lift, air, sea and ground);
  - conduct special operations;
  - conduct offensive air operations;
  - conduct deep strike operations;
  - conduct air-land combat operations;
  - conduct peace enforcement operations;
  - conduct peacekeeping operations;
  - perform constabulary missions;
  - protect forces;
  - protect civilian assets (in theater and homeland defense);
  - support the force/other government agencies;
  - provide humanitarian assistance;
  - coordinate with humanitarian/NGO organizations.
4. **Key military/non-military capabilities (2005 and 2015), and their availability to the intervening coalition.** The subgroups then examined the key military and non-military capabilities to perform the identified tasks, with emphasis again on the military area. Each subgroup also had to determine the availability of these capabilities to its coalition construction. This exercise allowed each subgroup to identify shortfalls in key capabilities that its coalition construction could encounter in both the 2005 and 2015 crisis interventions. In the case of the NATO/U.S.-led coalition, U.S.-European cooperability issues figured more prominently than capability shortfalls.

## COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF SUBGROUP RESULTS

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5. **Military options and concepts of operations.** Based on the previously defined political objectives, military and non-military tasks, and available capabilities, the subgroups outlined a concept of operations for carrying out each of their crisis interventions. The concepts covered the time, location, nature and type of action to be conducted in order to achieve desired political objectives.
6. **Interactive Assessments.** The subgroups did not conduct a detailed operational planning and war-gaming exercise, which was not necessary to meet project goals and for which they did not have the necessary resources. Instead, the subgroups conducted their “interactive assessments” of each intervention only to the depth required to identify and analyze key political and military issues, with most emphasis on the military side. They thus tested how a limited number of responses from adversary or local belligerent forces could challenge their defined concepts of operations, in both 2005 and 2015.

The peace enforcement intervention was the only one for which the subgroups examined low, medium and high-end variations of the scenario, depicting a gradation of possible difficulties that the intervening coalition might face. In the low-end variation, the coalition only had to deal with paramilitary activity. In the medium variation, the coalition faced some opposition from East State regular forces, and in the high end it faced large-scale opposition from those forces. Project staff prepared an evaluation table template (Table A.2, page 63) for the subgroups to use at their discretion in determining capability requirements, shortfalls, and U.S.-European cooperability issues, tested against these limited adversary responses. The results of these interactive assessments are reported in Appendix C, page 73.

## COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF SUBGROUP RESULTS

Throughout this process, the subgroups met in plenary session to present, discuss, and analyze the results of their efforts. In drawing together and comparing the output of the three subgroups, questions such as the following provided a focus for analysis:

## **APPENDIX A. PROJECT METHODOLOGY**

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- Will the EU permanent structure facilitate or delay the political and military decision cycle among nations and multinational organizations (NATO, UN, etc.) during the pre-crisis phase?
- Should the political and military decision process be formalized between EU and NATO, and possibly to some extent with other multinational organizations (such as the UN), to ensure effective and timely decisions?
- Could the differences in terms of military capabilities and concepts of operation between European and U.S. forces create major problems in defining a coherent NATO course of action to deal with a peace enforcement mission in Europe?
- Will strategic options significantly differ between NATO/U.S.-led and EU-led coalitions with or without NATO/U.S. support in the peace enforcement mission in Europe?
- Would any differences be due essentially to military capabilities or will other factors influence the different approaches (political, social, cultural, historical, etc.)?
- Could differences in military capabilities and doctrine between European and U.S. forces lead them to conduct essentially different types of missions, possibly in a separate battlespace, in a regional conflict?
- What would be the implications of the commitment of substantial levels of military forces to homeland defense, or in support of an Allied government facing an internal terrorist threat, outside the main theater of operation, during the development of a crisis?

## COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF SUBGROUP RESULTS

Table A.2: Illustrative evaluation table template of U.S.–EU capabilities, shortfalls and cooperability issues prepared for subgroup use.

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<b>Command arrangements:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● pol-mil interaction</li> <li>● situation assessment</li> <li>● strategic planning</li> <li>● simulation</li> <li>● secure strategic and tactical communications (coms)</li> </ul>			
<b>Information and Intelligence (intel):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● strategic intelligence</li> <li>● theater and tactical ISR</li> <li>● information operations (network defensive and offensive operations)</li> </ul>			
<b>Force projection:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● strategic lift (air, sea, ground)</li> <li>● air refueling</li> <li>● tactical lift</li> </ul>			
<b>Force protection:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● SEAD</li> <li>● counter mine operations</li> <li>● NBC</li> <li>● air and missile defense</li> </ul>			
<b>Engagement:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● deep strike operations</li> <li>● medium forces</li> <li>● special forces</li> <li>● amphibious forces</li> </ul>			
<b>Logistics:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● support</li> <li>● sustain</li> </ul>			

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## APPENDIX A. PROJECT METHODOLOGY

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Table A.2: Evaluation Table Template (Continued)

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<b>Civilian-Military Cooperation:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• inter-agency, NGO</li><li>• constabulary force</li></ul>			

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

# APPENDIX B

## Crisis Situations

### INTRODUCTION

This appendix contains a more detailed description of the crisis situations that the CESDP working group and subgroups used to explore how different coalition constructions would perform in carrying out a peace enforcement mission, a full scale combat operation, and a humanitarian support intervention. The crisis scenarios that supported the coalitions' undertaking of these interventions are:

- renewed ethnic tension and conflict in South-Eastern Europe,
- a regional conflict in the Arabian Peninsula, linked with a major international terrorism threat, and
- a humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Despite some obvious similarities with past or present crises, the countries and situations described are purely fictitious and are only relevant to the purposes of this project. In order to provide sufficient level of background information, each fictitious country was treated as equivalent to a real country in terms of physical and human characteristics, unless otherwise specified.

### ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

The three political entities involved are East State, West State, and Eastern Province. In order to facilitate the conduct of the study, East State was treated as equivalent in its physical and human characteristics to Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), West State to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Eastern Province to the Republika Srpska. For common reference, the country descriptions provided by the CIA World Fact Book 2001 were suggested for this scenario as well as for the two others. (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>)

## **APPENDIX B. CRISIS SITUATIONS**

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### **Origins of the crisis**

Following the withdrawal of the last peacekeeper from Southeastern Europe about two years ago, ethnic-related tension has progressively increased over the past six months along a disputed border between East State and West State. A succession of serious incidents, opposing paramilitary forces on each side of the border, leads to the outbreak of military hostilities. East State forces succeed, at minor cost, in securing a contested area between the two countries, provoking significant movements of refugees. Internal ethnic confrontation flares up within West State in several locations. The relative ethnic homogeneity of West State's Eastern province keeps it largely protected from the civil unrest. Eastern Province has always maintained close ethnic ties with East State. West State military and paramilitary forces now have to face both external and internal threats in addition to their own ethnic-related internal tensions.

Two weeks into the conflict, the international community's diplomatic efforts succeed in brokering a cease-fire between East and West states. Military confrontation ceases but West State's internal situation keeps deteriorating. Eastern Province then declares its formal secession from West State, and requests assistance from East State to safeguard its newly acquired autonomy. East State is prompt to acknowledge this request and initiates direct logistical support to Eastern Province's autonomous paramilitary force. The internal security situation of what remains of West State becomes uncontrollable. The West State government requests assistance from the international community to reestablish its authority within national borders.

### **Background information**

East State, with about 20 million inhabitants, is led by an authoritarian regime which has distanced itself from other Western countries. The current government enjoys the wide support of the East State ethnic majority for its attitude toward West State. Minorities in East State have little impact at the local or national level due to their variety and dispersed distribution throughout the country.

West State, with about 6 million inhabitants, has a democratic government. West State has always strived to improve relations with the West. The country's population is essentially composed of two

ethnic groups, one of which is very close to East State's. The lack of true economic and political integration has allowed ethnic divisions to remain. Strong partisan attitudes are very common between the two communities. West State's Eastern Province represents a more homogeneous ethnic block, with about two million inhabitants. It has maintained a semi autonomous, democratically elected government with independent paramilitary forces.

### **Military and paramilitary forces**

East State 2005 baseline forces:

- Army: 50,000 (mechanized forces with 1995 vintage equipment, being modernized)
- Navy: A few surface combatants and diesel submarines
- Air force: 100 modern combat aircraft, integrated air defense
- Paramilitary: 120,000 (plus 10,000 in Eastern province)

East State armed forces are deemed able to:

- operate very capable command, control, communications and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I), and integrated air defense systems, with mobile surface-to-air missile and air defense fighters;
- conduct all-weather air strikes with high performance aircraft and precision-guided munitions;
- ensure permanent anti-ship capabilities at sea;
- engage a heavy mechanized force equivalent to a NATO division with a well-balanced combination of armor, fire support and organic air defense assets;
- conduct extended guerilla and counter-guerilla operations throughout the region with well-trained and motivated paramilitary forces.

By 2015, the following additional capabilities are assumed available to East State forces:

## **APPENDIX B. CRISIS SITUATIONS**

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- some low-observable aircraft/missile detection capabilities;
- high-precision strike capabilities offered to mobile tactical ballistic missiles, with satellite navigation system terminal guidance;
- mechanized ground forces that have been brought up to 2010 standards.

### **CONFLICT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA**

The political entities involved are East State, considered as equivalent in its physical and human characteristics to Oman, and West State, considered as equivalent to the United Arab Emirates.

#### **Origins of the crisis**

Following a radical change of political regime in East State two years ago, the new government has discretely but vigorously provided growing support to terrorist groups sharing similar ideologies, in the form of logistics and training facilities. Political and military tension has also built up with West State, a moderate neighbor. Internal unrest develops in West State, linked to the extremist political agenda promoted by the terrorist networks that have taken root in East State.

The discovery of vast new oil resources in the contested border area between the two countries leads, after a very short period of heightened tension, to a surprise attack by East State conventional forces. East State justifies its initial action by old border claims and alleged military threats from West State. Despite significant organized resistance put up by West State armed forces, East State succeeds in securing, in 48 hours, the northern portion of West State, including the oil rich border area and littoral cities. An attempt to overthrow the West State government by a small group of extremists is foiled, but several terrorist actions are successfully conducted in the West State capital against public buildings and at the international airport.

North of the West State capital, victorious East State forces undertake a rapid build up of key defensive positions well beyond the newly discovered oil field, including occupied littoral cities along the Western approach to the Straights of Hormuz. West State forces are able to

establish new defensive positions to protect their capital and the rest of the country from further East State military actions, at least for a time.

With declining support from other neighboring countries, West State calls upon the international community to help it stabilize its internal situation and regain sovereignty over its northern region. A leading figure of the terrorist networks hosted in East State publishes a statement explicitly threatening that any country providing assistance to West State's "corrupt regime" would expose itself to "massive direct retaliation" of an unspecified nature.

Despite every diplomatic effort conducted over the following weeks at various levels, East State rejects all injunction to withdraw its forces and threatens both West State and international sea-lanes in the Straights of Hormuz. East State's government also denies any direct support for or control over transnational terrorist network elements within its borders.

### **Military and paramilitary forces**

East State 2005 baseline forces:

- Army: 200,000 (heavy mechanized and light forces)
- Navy: limited coastal defense
- Air force: 200 combat aircraft, 20 tactical cargo aircraft, integrated air defense

East State forces are deemed able to:

- operate very capable C<sup>3</sup>I and integrated air defense systems, with mobile surface to air and air defense fighters sheltered in hardened bases;
- conduct all weather air strikes with high performance aircraft and precision-guided munitions;
- ensure some anti-ship capabilities along the littoral with land-based missiles, fast patrol boats, mine laying vessels and diesel submarines;

## **APPENDIX B. CRISIS SITUATIONS**

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- engage a heavy mechanized force equivalent to five NATO divisions with a well-balanced combination of armor, fire support and organic air defense assets, and
- conduct limited special force operations in desert and urban areas with well-trained and motivated commando forces.

By 2015, the following capabilities should also be assumed available to East State forces:

- some low-observable aircraft/missile detection capabilities, and
- high precision strike capabilities provided by tactical ballistic missiles with satellite navigation system terminal guidance.

## **HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN EAST AFRICA**

North State (equivalent to Eritrea) and South State (equivalent to Ethiopia) are the two directly involved political entities.

### **Origins of the crisis**

Following an extreme period of drought for the second year in a row, accompanied by an outbreak of epidemic disease, the humanitarian situation in both North State and South State in East Africa has become extremely precarious. Uncontrolled armed groups operating on each side of the border create additional concerns regarding the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which has progressively been set up under UN auspices. Local authorities are unable to cope with their respective internal security situation.

The international community has been increasingly sensitized over the preceding months about the human tragedy that is unfolding in the region, where aid organizations are close to be overwhelmed. Also, there is a growing concern in the U.S. and in Europe for the safety of a rather large co-funded and recently established oil and gas prospecting complex in the southwest area of North State (a 50 by 50 mile area near the South State border), well within reach of some uncontrolled armed groups. About 2000 U.S. and European (30/70) work and live in the complex of a dozen prospecting sites and two main support bases.

The UN thus appeals to the international community to provide a humanitarian assistance force to stabilize the situation in the region.

### **Armed groups**

Several independent groups are operating across the border between North and South states, with undetermined support on both sides. Their equipment essentially consists of individual weapons and heavy-machine-gun armed four-wheel vehicles, but also includes a limited number of anti-tank rockets and man portable air defense systems.



## **APPENDIX C**

# **Detailed Reports of the Coalition Interventions**

This appendix describes in greater detail the work of the project subgroups in carrying out the methodological approach laid out in Appendix A (page 57) using the crisis situations described in Appendix B (page 65). The subgroup work is presented in the following order:

- Balkans Peace Enforcement Intervention
  - NATO/U.S.-led coalition (this page)
  - EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support (page 77)
  - EU Autonomous coalition (page 87)
- Regional Conflict In Arabia (U.S.-led coalition, page 91)
- Humanitarian Support In Africa (EU-led coalition, page 99)

## **BALKANS PEACE ENFORCEMENT INTERVENTION**

### **NATO/U.S.-led Coalition**

The subgroup responsible for the NATO/U.S.-led coalition construction established the following near and long-term political objectives for its intervention in the project's Balkans type crisis:

- The containment of the crisis within the boundaries of West and East State;
- The cessation of hostilities from East State and East supporting factions;
- The restoration of law and order in West State and West State sovereignty over Eastern Province; and

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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- Long-term settlement of Eastern Province's status and the contested border area between East State and West State through various political, diplomatic and economical means.

The intervening forces would be essentially constituted by a NATO Combined Joint task Force (CJTF). The overall command structure would include NATO SHAPE and NATO CINCSOUTH as the regional commander, the CJTF headquarters and the land, air and maritime component headquarters. The ground forces would include a mix of NATO European mechanized units and U.S. units, as well as special force units. Two carrier battle groups (1 U.S. and 1 French/UK) would constitute the naval component of the intervening force. The U.S. battle group would also bring additional air-ground capabilities with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). A robust air defense and deep strike capability (air and ground assets) would be deployed in or within range of the theater. Additional strategic or tactical reconnaissance assets would also have to be dedicated to the operation.

The general concept would be to deploy the European ground forces forward in West State to prevent any further degradation of the situation on the ground and to allow for the progressive return of West State authority and sovereignty. U.S. ground forces would be kept in reserve, as a deterrent or for any contingencies with which the European ground forces might not be able to cope. The coalition would thus insert one fully manned European division into Eastern Province (French, German, UK) and 2 U.S. brigades (one warfighting and one reconnaissance) in Western Province. In 2005 it should be possible to move the U.S. forces in 30 days by large aircraft and ships. Use of road and rail from Northern Europe may be sufficient to move the European land forces within the European theater. The two carrier battle groups would provide additional support for sanctions enforcement (maritime embargo) and deterrence.

Overall, the subgroup did not foresee any capability issues for the NATO/U.S.-led coalition in performing the central military tasks involved in the intervention: securing the border between East and West States as well as other key points in Eastern Province through the deployment of specialist forces, occupying Eastern Province with European NATO forces supported by U.S. and European airpower and U.S. reserve ground forces in West State and off shore, disarming remaining paramilitaries and irregulars in Eastern Province, and

protecting humanitarian aid distribution to displaced persons. The subgroup nonetheless made the following observations regarding the non-military and military tasks involved in carrying out the intervention, related capabilities, and cooperability issues between U.S. and European forces:

- **Intelligence preparation of the operational space.** Providing for adequate space surveillance will be a problem because local forces will have more knowledge of the operational space, which they will be able to exploit for deception. Urbanization will also greatly increase the overhead surveillance problem. Terrain and environmental data collection capabilities will need to improve to keep step with the development of precision weapons. Coordinated targeting of U.S. and European space-based reconnaissance assets would be beneficial in that context. There is a need to be able to surge in gathering, assimilating, and disseminating intelligence during an emerging crisis. There is a need as well to improve cooperation in multinational exchange of intelligence (technical and HUMINT, civil and military). Multinational intelligence exchanges regarding defense against preemptive asymmetric attack will also be required.
- **Mission planning and campaign rehearsal.** The success of such an operation would be very dependent on intelligence preparation of the operational space and operational planning. The U.S. would be able to provide a large amount of information to create very representative synthetic environments, but there is a need for connectivity with European headquarters with a sufficient level of security and bandwidth that is not currently available nor guaranteed in a foreseeable future.
- **Psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaign to reinforce compliance in East State and Eastern Province.** There is a need for people who have a deep understanding of the mindsets of the target populations to assist in the design of the PSYOPS campaign. The coalition would require a TV/radio broadcast capability as well as TV/ radio jammers.
- **Preparing the public information environment.** U.S. regional Commanders-in-chief (CINCs) have the capability to assemble

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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and promulgate evidence of immediate humanitarian concern to indigenous populations, populations of engaged and interested nations (e.g. in theater), own national populations, and UN Security Council nations. NATO and the EU should be able to generate it, or perhaps rely on UN databases and other open source data exploitation.

- **Protection of own information systems.** There is a need to assess the vulnerability of the coalition's own information structures. Intelligence systems need to address the coalition's own vulnerabilities as well as those of the potential opposition, and to test penetration of coalition information resources (coalition network monitoring).
- **Establish rules of engagement (ROE).** The coalition needs to pay particular attention to any ROE that restrict engagement with East State forces or place other limitations on the use of coalition assets. It is unlikely that by 2015 coalition partners will have achieved a common ROE system. Theater commanders will need to task coalition forces depending on the particular ROE under which individual nations' forces are operating.
- **Insert special operations forces (SOF) into Eastern Province for reconnaissance.** Technology can reduce the number of people required as well as provide adequate language translation. It may be a priority for SOF to have digitization and communications connectivity across national boundaries.
- **Air operations.** The coalition would bring air defense assets into the theater, including suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capability and air interdiction forces in case East State mobilizes. The coalition would achieve a favorable air situation and protect allied ground forces by setting up air defenses, including theater missile defense. There would be a requirements for airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), antiradiation missiles (ARM), short range air defense (SHORAD), high to medium altitude air defense and tactical ballistic missile defense (HIMAD/TBMD), airborne ISR, combat air patrol (CAP), and air-to-air refueling. The coalition would not have any capability shortfalls using a combination of U.S. and European assets.

- **Establish ISR capability in theater, in particular with coverage of troop movements in East State and Eastern Province.** For countries bringing relevant assets, C<sup>4</sup>ISR needs to be integrated across national boundaries, with a required capability for data fusion in order to provide an integrated Common Operational Picture for all coalition partners together with sensor-to-shooter capability. The coalition should optimize weapons target pairing across national boundaries, and provide a compatible combat identification system (including loaned equipment) for all coalition partners.
- **Logistics.** A common system for the identification of stores and spares would be useful. The coalition would need to establish protection for its logistics base and lines of support, with the principal threat coming from indigenous irregular ground forces.
- **Insertion of external civilian police advisers/monitors to work alongside Eastern Province police under UN mandate.** Five thousand EU police should be available by 2005, but there is a need as well for judicial and penal services. These would hopefully be indigenous, but there may be a need for external assistance. The coalition should consider using the Australian model of intervention/indigenous joint police/penal/judicial teams. Procedures will be needed and the role of military forces defined for dealing with war criminals.

### **EU-Led Intervention with NATO/U.S. Support (Balkans)**

The subgroup representing the EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support established as its long term objectives achieving a stable resolution of the “Balkans problem,” helping East State and West State to become good neighbors, and integrating them into the wider European community. Near-term political objectives for the intervention focused on creating a favorable and enduring military and security situation in order to allow political, social and economic stabilization of the region. The coalition’s three near-term objectives were thus to bring about East State’s withdrawal from West State, to secure the disputed border, and to stabilize West State.

With respect to political-military decision-making towards the crisis, the organization that currently exists at the EU level, the Political

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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and Security Committee (PSC or COPS by its French acronym) is not very reactive, if considerable work has not already been done at higher level (heads of state). So there is a need for good anticipation, otherwise the EU decision process is likely to freeze. However, the EU's constructive abstention approach could help. The EU could actually be less constrained than NATO, which operates by consensus, although there is still a possibility of national vetoes under "constructive abstention." PSC, through its diplomatic chain of intelligence, has quick information coming in, but it is not fully reliable. There is a need for a military chain of intelligence to have reliable information on which to act. In short, it is very difficult to deal with the pre-conflict decision-making phase. National interests are not fully engaged yet, as they are once "boots are on the ground," and intelligence sharing is consequently more difficult. The quality of leadership in both EU and NATO will be critical. Agreement among major European players would be needed.

The subgroup considered low, medium, and high-end variations of the crisis scenario. In the low-end version, East State agrees to withdraw from Eastern province, leaving small pockets of resistance from Eastern province paramilitary units as well as from criminal activity. EU light infantry and light/medium armored units would deploy to replace withdrawing East State forces, with armored units going to areas of resistance and light infantry to stable areas. Air support would also be required for units in areas of resistance (light infantry could come under threat as well). A medium-heavy weight force would subsequently flow in to provide deterrence and reassurance, growing to a corps size deployment.

In the low-end scenario ROE's are fairly restrictive. Coalition forces do not seek out Eastern province paramilitaries, acting only in self-defense. Countries have different interpretations of self-defense, with France, for example, more restrictive than the UK and U.S., but NATO militaries will probably not have too much trouble dealing with these difference since they know each other well. Since only irregular forces would be opposing the coalition, the problem is harder to deal with than if resistance were coming from an organized military structure. To deal with this problem the coalition would need three capabilities: a liaison net, specialized forces for contact with all local influential players, and civil affairs teams. These capabilities do not

exist within permanent military structures. The EU is setting up civil-military (CIMIC) battalions, so the problem is recognized and being worked on.

In the medium-end scenario, an initial withdrawal of East State forces takes place. The initial coalition deployment takes place as outlined for the low-end scenario. However, the situation then deteriorates further and coalition military units come under attack from East State organized as well as Eastern Province paramilitary forces. The coalition is confronted with a limited combat situation and needs to build up reaction forces.

In the high-end scenario, East State agrees in principle to withdraw from the disrupted border area, but does not take any steps to do so. The coalition undertakes to compel an East State withdrawal. This compellence effort starts with a show of force build up in West State (and/or elsewhere in region) and a global information operations campaign, with East State as one of the targets. The coalition could target East State leadership with air and missile strikes to apply pressure to withdraw (attack sources of power, wealth of leadership), with tactical strikes on East State forces also taking place. A psychological operations campaign would attempt to turn Eastern Province's population against the East State presence. This range of options would attempt to undermine East State's will to stay in Eastern Province. A compellence campaign at some point would have to switch to preparation of the battlefield physically to drive out East State forces. The coalition's operational concept for the high-end scenario would therefore progress from targeted strikes to discredit East State's leadership up to full scale operations. It would be important to avoid alienating the Eastern Province majority as a lack of support for East State within Eastern Province could be a significant factor in determining East State's response.

The evaluation table C.1 that begins on page 80 summarizes the military capabilities that the coalition would need in carrying out the operations outlined above, as well as the availability of those capabilities to the coalition.

In EU shortfall analyses, the absence of a particular capability is rarely a showstopper. In most cases the EU-led coalition can change the concept of operations. If there is a slower flow of information, for example, the operation would be conducted more slowly, based on

## APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS

an alternative approach. If a European force did not have digitized communications for an air campaign, for example, it could resort to very thorough pre-flight briefings, and then fly under silence, although this would make it very difficult to hit fleeting mobile targets. Flying in low could also be an option for a European-led air campaign operating without secure communications. However, alternative operational concepts could well entail higher risks in terms of mission success and likely magnitude of casualties.

Table C.1: Evaluation Table for the EU-led Coalition with NATO/U.S. Support: Capabilities, Shortfalls and Synergies in the Peace Enforcement Scenario

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<b>Command arrangements:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● pol-mil interaction</li> <li>● situation assessment<sup>1</sup></li> <li>● strategic planning<sup>2</sup></li> <li>● simulation</li> <li>● secure strategic and tactical communications (coms)</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>EU shortfalls exist in situational assessment, strategic planning, simulation, secure coms, and deployable communications modules.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Red EU autonomous Yellow with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Higher operational tempo exacerbates shortfalls. Big stumbling block is secure coms and simulation becomes unavailable because of short reaction times.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Red EU autonomous Yellow with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Previous comments apply even more.</p>
	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>EU shortfalls solved across all capability areas. Could have some secure coms problems between EU and U.S. forces.<sup>3</sup> New U.S. systems may not be backward compatible with existing NATO ones; on other hand, Europe is trying to modernize as well (will be digitized by 2015). If do have coms problems, should be able to work around them in this coalition construction, across all three columns.</p>	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## BALKANS PEACE ENFORCEMENT INTERVENTION

Table C.1: EU-led with NATO/U.S. Support (Continued)

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<p><b>Information and Intelligence (intel):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● strategic intelligence</li> <li>● theater and tactical ISR</li> <li>● information operations (network defensive and offensive operations)</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Yellow+ with NATO/U.S.<sup>4</sup></p> <p>Humint, non-technical intelligence, info ops are weak points. Even with U.S. support, non-technical intel is significant shortfall. Strategic ISR, theater surveillance and reconnaissance ground and air picture, and signals intelligence for operational warning of possible incursions, are all EU shortfalls.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Yellow+ EU autonomous Yellow+ with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Most problems fixed, but still problem of sharing humint at low end.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Relative importance of non-technical intel declines as one moves up the combat spectrum.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Increased ISR needs in order to use new systems most effectively, but should be able to meet these needs due to digitization and new sensors, platforms and data links.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Red EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Relative importance of non-technical intel declines as one moves up the combat spectrum. EU ISR overtaxed.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Need for much more battle damage assessment (BDA); this is a huge requirement.</p>
<p><b>Force projection:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● strategic lift (air, sea, ground)</li> <li>● air refueling</li> <li>● tactical lift</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.<sup>5</sup></p> <p>Smaller, lighter force than for the next two columns.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>EU shortfalls in air-to-air refueling, strategic and tactical mobility.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Red EU autonomous Yellow (?) with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>U.S. lift would need to be reconfigured for other countries' forces; also U.S. could have assets committed elsewhere. EU shortfalls would greatly affect deployment times.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS

Table C.1: EU-led with NATO/U.S. Support (Continued)

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<p><b>Force protection:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SEAD</li> <li>• counter mine operations</li> <li>• NBC</li> <li>• air and missile defense</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Don't need SEAD at this end, counter-mine capability good.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Same factors apply.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Chem/bio and missile threat, but EU countries have current projects for individual and collective protection. Some uncertainty over maintaining of funding. Also will have new extended air defense systems deployed. Don't believe that East State use of chem/bio weapons is likely in low and medium variations of the crisis.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Red EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>EU lacks SEAD for high end, although by 2004 EU countries will have sufficient combat search and rescue teams.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green (?) EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>In theory SEAD shortfall should be filled, but uncertainty over maintaining funding for planned projects. In high end, East State could possibly be pushed towards chem/bio use; bio more likely. If there were perception of threat to EU member territory, would have Article 5 situation, and very probable turn to NATO to carry out the intervention even if EU could handle it in other respects.</p>
<p><b>Engagement:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• deep strike operations</li> <li>• medium forces</li> <li>• special forces</li> <li>• amphibious forces</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Will have all "material" needed, but problem will be to operate in a combined way.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>EU will have good engagement capability in 2005, including for precision strike, but with enduring operation will be questions over munitions stockpiles.</p>

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## BALKANS PEACE ENFORCEMENT INTERVENTION

Table C.1: EU-led with NATO/U.S. Support (Continued)

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<p><b>Engagement:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● deep strike operations</li> <li>● medium forces</li> <li>● special forces</li> <li>● amphibious forces</li> </ul>	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Subgroup assumed that EU capabilities will remain ahead of those of a Balkan nation. However, always have question mark over ability of democracies to maintain efforts in defense area.</p>	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>
<p><b>Logistics:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● support</li> <li>● sustain</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Yellow with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Still under consideration at EU, don't know exact depth of shortfall. U.S. contribution doesn't help much because capabilities too specialized. Lot of material not transferable for use by other countries. Also problem of U.S. troops on ground.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Should have solved this problem by 2015; issue mainly of organization rather than money.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Yellow EU autonomous Yellow with NATO/U.S.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Red EU autonomous Red with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>Not red for all countries taken separately, but red at the multinational level. Huge sovereignty and coordination problems at multinational level, especially as one goes up the combat spectrum.</p> <p><b>2015</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>
<p><b>Civilian-Military Cooperation:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● inter-agency, NGO</li> <li>● constabulary force</li> </ul>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green (?) EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p> <p>ROE for constabulary forces will be huge problem. Creation of constabulary force and ROE being worked on.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>	<p><b>2005</b></p> <p>Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.</p>

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS

Table C.1: EU-led with NATO/U.S. Support (Continued)

Capabilities	Low-level variation	Medium-level variation	High-level variation
<b>Civilian-Military Cooperation:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● inter-agency, NGO</li> <li>● constabulary force</li> </ul>	<b>2015</b>  Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.	<b>2015</b>  Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.	<b>2015</b>  Green EU autonomous Green with NATO/U.S.

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

The speed of an operation will be particularly important if there is a need to take coercive action. The UK and France would be able to meet readiness requirements for deployment within 60 days, but there could be readiness issues for other European countries. For a European peace enforcement intervention, most heavy equipment would move by road and rail, so air and sealift would not be an issue. If East State started withdrawing immediately from the disputed border area, the coalition would want to insert light forces very quickly in order to fill the vacuum.

Effects or capabilities based approaches can help identify alternative or smarter ways of doing something. If no EU country has a project to deal with a particular shortfall, there could potentially be an alternative means of meeting the requirement.

If a EU intervention – with more than a small number of countries participating – needed a high-intensity combat capability in 2005, it would probably need to use the NATO command structure and subsequently hand off to a lighter, national command structure. At least in the immediate future, the larger the coalition the more important it would be for NATO to run the operation. The UK or France would probably not be ready by 2005 to provide the command structure for a high-intensity, multinational combat operation with more than a handful of countries participating. If the EU were able to intervene earlier in the crisis and did not need to go so far up the combat spectrum, the UK or France would be able to provide the command structure.

The NATO command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) structure would dovetail into an EU operation through the role of the deputy SACEUR as joint commander of the EU operation. The DSACEUR would bring the

operational planning capability to the EU-led intervention as well as a link to NATO. The countries participating in the intervention would have to decide on the operational force commander.

While EU nations would be able to provide the required ground combat units, both in terms of quantity and quality, some combat support functions might be problematic such as, for light forces, support helicopters or transport battalions for in-theater tactical mobility, and engineering units for mobility and counter mobility. In 2005, the EU force's mobile reserve would have to consist of armor, but by 2015 EU countries would have a credible attack helicopter capability that could quickly self-deploy. The EU force would therefore have a more credible heavy element in 2015 than in 2005. Carrier aviation would also be self-supporting. In 2015, the EU-led force would be more deployable, would have a European framework nation headquarters, would be able to command itself on a more multinational basis, and would have significant improvements in information and intelligence, command, control and communications, and mobility.

For the EU-led coalition with NATO/U.S. support, U.S. assets would also be available to help fill in 2005 EU capability shortfalls. Some of the current European capability shortfall areas are deficits rather than complete shortfalls, so the U.S. contribution would not need to be as substantial as might otherwise seem. Bandwidth on satellite communications, aerial refueling, lift, and ISR all constitute capabilities that the U.S. would probably be willing to provide to EU-led operations. If the EU were to need capabilities that involve "pulling the trigger" (including cruise missiles), there could be a considerable question mark over the U.S. willingness to provide them. In such a circumstance, the United States would likely prefer that the operation take place under a command arrangement that would give Washington a more direct role in operational decision-making.

Intelligence sharing is a major challenge between the U.S. and Europe, as well as within Europe. Situational awareness is one of the EU's key operational weaknesses. Tactical intelligence sharing is generally not a problem, but sharing intelligence at the operational and strategic levels raises issues. There is a strong need for more intelligence sharing and for the development of common procedures for doing so. National intelligence cells within multinational headquarters will probably always be needed because of the sensitivity of HUMINT.

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Special Forces in some ways present the same problem as intelligence capabilities. As militaries professionalize and develop more specialized capabilities, gray areas on the borderline between special and conventional forces may emerge. For example, if a light infantry battalion were operating in dispersed platoons, would they constitute conventional or special forces?

The issue of avoiding a repetition of the UNPROFOR experience is an important one for this coalition construction. During UNPROFOR operations from 1992–1995 the U.S. provided important support capabilities, including airpower, but did not have any forces at risk on the ground. The unequal sharing of risks helped contribute to divergent European and U.S. politico-military approaches to the Bosnian crisis, with Washington at times undermining EU policy.

Nonetheless, there would be important differences between what took place during UNPROFOR and a CESDP intervention with NATO/U.S. support. The U.S. would have taken a deliberate decision in the North Atlantic Council to have the EU lead the intervention, and the intervention would likely take place using the NATO command structure with the deputy SACEUR as the joint commander. Under these conditions, Washington probably would agree to contribute to an EU-led operation while allowing the EU control of crisis decision-making without undue involvement from the U.S. However, if the situation appeared to risk getting out of control, Washington would very probably want significant involvement in shaping policy towards the crisis out of concern that it would have to deepen its military engagement in order to rescue the EU intervention.

In summary, an EU-led peace enforcement intervention in 2005 appears feasible using the NATO command structure with DSACEUR as the joint commander, the U.S. providing missing support capabilities. However, in the high-end variation of the scenario, there remain sufficient EU shortfalls to warrant serious consideration of having a NATO flagged operation. The potential for escalation from low to high intensity operation must also be considered by policy makers in determining the appropriate coalition formation. In 2015, the EU should be able to conduct all variations of this type of crisis situation without relying on NATO/U.S. support, assuming current and projected defense programs are funded and implemented.

### **EU Autonomous Operation (Balkans)**

The subgroup responsible for the EU autonomous operation decided upon three broad political objectives for its intervention: restoration of the territorial integrity of West State, restoration and stabilization of West State's internal security, and prevention of further East State aggression as well as the reduction of hostility between the two countries. The subgroup recognized that a resolution timeline was difficult to establish and that it would be more appropriate to consider the phasing of the intervention in accordance with the achieved results on the ground. Nation building measures were also to be considered, both internal (police, judiciary, finance) and external (relationship with the EU).

The subgroup then considered the military tasks to be performed to achieve its political objectives. It broadly described those tasks as, while deterring East State, (i) conduct military operations that would support and consolidate the position of the government in West State; and (ii) conduct information operations directed at Eastern Province and East State ("we are not the enemy, we are here to help"). In the longer run, law and order would also have to be maintained in West State while deterring West State from resuming hostilities.

The subgroup assumed that for this EU autonomous operation neither the U.S. nor NATO is opposed to the operation, and that there is an EU political agreement to conduct it. The following areas were identified as key military capabilities:

- Intelligence;
- Political and military planning resources;
- Command and control structure;
- Communications;
- Lift for forces and associated support.

The subgroup recognized that intelligence contributions would remain a national responsibility and ways of sharing resources and products would have to be explored. Special forces deployed early in theater

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would also provide valuable information. Political and military planning resources must be available to perform the required exchanges in the planning and execution phases of the intervention.

The subgroup identified three levels of command and control for the EU-autonomous intervention: EU military staff, strategic headquarters (i.e. UK PJHQ or future French CPCO), and deployable headquarters. The coalition would also need to identify suitable means of communications and lift. With respect to lift (for deployed forces and their logistics), the geographical situation of West State would make ground transportation (road and train) the preferred choice, with air and sea as back ups. Initial deployment by air of early entry forces would nevertheless be very likely. As far as land forces were concerned, the use of special forces and light infantry early in the operation was considered as very likely without excluding the need for heavier mechanized forces as a follow on. Logistics and air assets would also be required. The EU standing police force would be valuable in initial law enforcement tasks as well as in subsequent training and support for the previously identified non-military tasks.

The EU intervention would be carried out by light and medium/heavy elements that would build up rapidly to a two-division size land force package with appropriate air and possibly naval support. This force, deployed in West State, would be rapidly backed up by a significant air strike force package, as well as, if needed later on, additional ground forces in reserve. The related air assets and ground forces would remain in neighboring EU countries.

The threefold mission of the deployed forces would be to assist the West State government in restoring internal security (excluding Eastern Province), to deter East State forces from moving further west into Eastern Province, and to mark the EU's determination to achieve subsequent settlement of the situation in the Eastern Province as well as in the contested areas through a combination of diplomatic, economic, and if necessary, military action. The latter would possibly require deployment of additional forces in West State. The rapid deployment of light force elements would signal the EU's readiness to escalate to the level needed to deter or defeat any conceivable opposition.

The subgroup assumed that the initial entry of the rapidly deployed light elements would be performed in a permissive environment. EU forces are indeed invited by West State and they would not attempt any

deployment in Eastern Province. The land force package would be task organized in two components. One, about one third of the total force, would be dedicated to the internal security mission. It would draw on EU police resources but also include light combat units to back up the police force. The second component would be a heavier mechanized combat force. It would be set up in order to provide, in combination with the “over the horizon” air strike force package deployed in neighboring EU states, the necessary deterrent against East forces to prevent them from progressing any further into West State (including Eastern Province).

The intervention would be conducted under the command structure foreseen for EU operations without NATO support. One leading EU nation would provide the strategic headquarters as well as the strategic planning capabilities, with reinforcements provided by countries prepared to commit forces to the intervention. A mobile theater headquarters would be similarly set up. The necessary component headquarters, based on existing national or multinational forces, would be deployed as well. Further consideration should be given to issues concerning the integration of political and military functions in theater.

The subgroup made the following observations with respect to required capabilities for the intervention and their availability to the coalition:

- **Importance of a timely political decision for the envisioned intervention.** This is deemed necessary to allow the early commitment of the limited force the coalition envisaged deploying. The EU could take some time to complete its own assessment of the situation, finalize shared political objectives, and agree on the ways and means to reach them. The related political and military interaction would take place in European capitals, between capitals, and in Brussels. As previously discussed, it is important to consider political and military interactions during the pre-crisis, pre-decision phase of an intervention, as well as during it. The structure established in Brussels should provide for, on paper, the necessary exchanges, including both the civilian and military aspects of crisis management. More detailed coordination between organizations belonging to different components of the EU structure (pillars) might have to be developed to provide adequate capabilities in specific areas (economy, finance,

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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law enforcement, civil defense). Currently, this coordination essentially takes place at the highest level. The currently defined structure needs to and will be exercised. By 2005, political and military interactions within the EU should still be a little rough. By 2015, these interactions should be much smoother, despite the increased number of member states. Like NATO, the EU will have to consider how to increase reliance on framework nation structures and political leadership from major contributing nations to ensure the effectiveness of its actions.

- **Situation assessment at strategic level.** For an intervention in Europe, the subgroup considered that despite its limited number of technical intelligence gathering assets compared to those of the U.S., EU members should have sufficient understanding of the unfolding situation to make appropriate political and military decisions at the strategic level.
- **Limitations in theater-level technical intelligence-gathering means.** Continuous all weather surveillance capabilities would prove critical to the monitoring of East State forces, and would decrease the risks associated with the deployment of a smaller EU force to deter the movement of East forces further westward. In 2005, EU forces would not have such a capability. At the tactical level, it was also recognized that even with quantitative and qualitative improvements similar to those brought to bear by U.S. forces during Operation Allied Force, expected technical surveillance means might still not be sufficient to allow for the precise location and tracking of well-dispersed, camouflaged, or concealed mechanized forces.
- **Air operations.** Known limitations in terms of air refueling and SEAD could also diminish the credibility of the air strike force package deployed in neighboring European countries. If all or some of this force had to intervene, the limited effectiveness of its intervention and/or significant losses due to the robust ground air defense capabilities of East State forces could have very adverse consequences on the evolution of the crisis.

In summary, the Balkans crisis situation presents some difficulties for an EU-autonomous operation. Significant national contributions

## **REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA**

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by countries like the UK and France would have to be made in terms of command and control, planning and communications. Additional intelligence capabilities would be highly desirable, as well as suppression of enemy air defense capabilities to ensure the credibility, or the effectiveness, of air strikes, if they had to be executed.

The EU's difficulties stem in part from shortfalls in key military assets like lift, SEAD, etc. They also stem from issues related to political coherence, which might hamper the decision-making process and prevent the vital early intervention of a smaller force. Leading European players might be able to act together, or even alone, more speedily and efficiently than the EU as a whole.

### **REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (U.S.-LED INTERVENTION)**

The subgroup established the broad political objectives for this coalition intervention as permitting West State to exercise sovereignty over its entire territory, assisting West State in achieving internal stability, and eliminating the international terrorist threat harbored in East State. Immediate objectives included:

- Remove terrorist network in East State;
- Secure withdrawal of East State forces from West State territory;
- Assist West State government in internal security measures to counter terrorist attack;
- Assist West State government in reestablishing governance and law and order (if necessary) in previously occupied areas of West State; and
- Prepare for possible evacuation of foreign nationals from West State.

Over the longer term, the coalition would assist West State in developing measures to prevent re-attack from East State, develop measures to rehabilitate East State into the international community,

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

and develop measures to resolve East State/West State historic border issues.

The subgroup reviewed the following military tasks for the U.S.-led coalition:

- Campaign rehearsal for a reinvasion of the northern part of West State.
- Preparation of the public information environment to facilitate intervention operations including reinvasion and counter-terrorist denial operations.
- Intelligence preparation of the operational space including:
  - Establishment of detailed terrain, oceanographic and other environmental data with a view to maritime, air and ground combat, taking into account the possibility of biological and chemical attack;
  - Analysis of power/elite structure in East State (and West State);
  - Assessment of capacity by East State for information attack and vulnerability of civil and military infrastructures in theater to information attack;
  - Update of East State, the “Major Regional Power,” and West State military capabilities;
  - Retargeting of U.S., EU and other coalition partners’ space surveillance assets; and
  - Tasking of military and civil intelligence agencies towards identification of terrorist personnel, infrastructure and resources in East and West States.
- Insertion of special forces into East State for counter-terrorist reconnaissance and denial missions, as well as for reconnaissance in preparation of a re-invasion of West State. Also insertion of special forces into north portion of West State for reconnaissance in preparation for a re-invasion, and elsewhere in West State to aid government in counter-terrorism.

## REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

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- Insert specialist forces to secure West State capital city airport and other significant military and civil air bases/ports and sea ports not in East State hands, with particular attention to the operations of irregular hostile forces.
- Bring maritime sea control forces, including mine-counter-measures, into theater to prevent reinforcement of East State, and to permit movement of coalition maritime forces and resources into theater. Establish defensive sea control.
- Bring land based and maritime offensive and defensive air assets, SEAD, air interdiction, close air support, and SAR forces into theater and West State.
- Oversee food and tents for displaced persons in southern part of West State if required and in coordination with UN, ICRC and NGOs.
- Prepare CIMIC and law enforcement and interrogation resources for use in northern part of West State after occupation.
- Use airborne and other surveillance and reconnaissance assets (as air situation permits) combined with space based surveillance to produce comprehensive information of East State force dispositions and movements.
- Bring maritime amphibious forces into theater in preparation for amphibious raids, feints and invasion.
- Establish defensive air superiority over non-occupied portions of West State.
- Insert air mobile ground forces into unoccupied West State to prevent further occupation, to assist West State government in internal security, and as advance parties for reinvasion forces.
- PSYOPS campaign to enforce compliance in East State and northern part of West State by warning of imminent invasion and offering opportunity for East State forces to retreat honorably.
- Establish and protect logistics base in West State and lines of support.

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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- Establish sea control in littoral of East and West States.
- Move sea mobile land forces into West State in preparation for reinvasion of northern areas.
- Move additional land forces into West State as an operational reserve in particular in case of a collapse of the East State government, resultant breakdown in law and order/civil war, and the need for peace enforcement.

If East State does not comply with diplomatic demands to withdraw from West State and cease harboring terrorists, the coalition would undertake the following military measures:

- Begin a maritime and land based air campaign to:
  - Establish offensive air superiority over East and West States;
  - Destroy terrorist capability (in association with special forces);
  - Interdict East State command and control and logistic nodes of vulnerability;
  - Interdict East State occupying land based forces in West State, East State reinforcements, and East State maritime assets.
- Following preparation of the battlespace, begin air-land and amphibious maneuver operations to liberate the northern part of West State.
- If appropriate, destroy retreating East State forces, in particular major systems, armor, artillery, aircraft, and shipping as a contribution to post-conflict disarmament.
- If appropriate, temporarily occupy adjacent territory of East State out to range of East State artillery in order to prevent retaliatory raiding.
- Establish a military occupation of West State.

## REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

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- Re-establishment of law and order and transfer of authority to West State governmental organs once they are in place and able to function.
- If there is a collapse of the East State government, prepare to insert peace enforcement forces into East State.
- After cease-fire, withdraw occupation forces from northern part of West State, leaving a sufficient forward based garrison and combat aircraft to deter any new attack.

In the longer term, the coalition would assist in the return of displaced persons to the northern part of West State. If the East State government has not collapsed, following conclusion of a treaty agreement the coalition would hand over responsibility for the border between East and West State to a UN peacekeeping force. If the East State government has collapsed, the coalition would continue with peace enforcement operations in East State until a new government has been established and forces can be replaced by UN or other stabilization forces.

The subgroup decided that the criteria for European participation in the intervention was that it should be significant, useful, and integrated, so that Europe is able to influence the strategic response to a crisis, weigh on the operational planning, and contribute to the outcome.

Significant (and equivalent) European ground forces would go a long way to achieving these objectives. Coalition ground forces will likely need to conduct military operations in urban terrain. East State forces may perhaps retreat to a redoubt in the high ground in the north-east of West State, and mountain warfare capability may be required. The coalition ground force requirement, given air superiority, would be one combined arms corps, comprising two U.S. divisions (transformation forces in 2015), and two European divisions. The evaluation table C.2 that begins on page 96 elaborates on U.S.-European cooperability issues for this coalition intervention.

## APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS

Table C.2: Evaluation Table for the U.S.-led Coalition: Capabilities, Shortfalls and Synergies in the Regional Conflict Scenario

Capabilities	Medium to High-Level Conflict
<b>Force Preparation:</b>	
Training, exercising, and doctrine	<p><b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU<sup>6</sup>  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Red for EU            Problems of achieving multinational training and exercising will be exacerbated by cost and ongoing operations. EU-only exercising will be a distraction from NATO/EU + U.S. exercising. Maximize use of synthetic environments/simulation. Political leaders must participate in exercising.</p>
<b>Command arrangements:</b>	
Pol-mil interaction	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU  <b>2015</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU            If NATO can exercise the pol-mil link in generic interventions, the habit of working together will improve ad hoc pol-mil arrangements. With the right will 'formalized ad hoc' arrangements involving framework nation structures and directorate political leadership could be developed. EU structures and processes may mature to be beneficial in this respect.</p>
Situation assessment Strategic planning	No particular comment
Simulation	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU, provided unfunded plans are realized.</p>
Secure communications (strategic and tactical)	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU  <b>2015</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU            Bandwidth shortages particularly in the longer term; competition from private sector will be a problem.</p>
Information management	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Yellow for EU            Multinational interoperability dependent on progress in Europe as well as on the U.S. providing protocols and addressing European legacy problems.</p>
In-theater command headquarters	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU            Because of connectivity, standards and doctrinal issues.  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU            Provided the above are addressed on a multinational basis.</p>
<b>Information and intel:</b>	
Strategic intelligence theater and tactical ISTAR information operations (network defensive and offensive operations), analysis, and data fusion.	<p><b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU            If nations can meet the need to be able to operate at a faster tempo than opponents. Require COP and fused surveillance/reconnaissance (SR) data as well as fused intelligence product. Need to be able to exchange SR data. Need more liaison staffs in national analysis centers. Need feedback loop including battle damage assessment (critical information requirements) and other evidential information. These capabilities clearly become hugely more significant in high intensity combat operations.</p>

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Table C.2: U.S.-led Coalition (Continued)

Capabilities	Medium to High-Level Conflict
Navigation	Security of GPS and redundancy of navigation systems is a problem.
Combat identity	<p><b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU                  Provided European nations develop systems compatible with U.S. ones. Without common combat ID European nations will not be able to undertake integrated combat with a U.S. transformed force – assuming that network-centric concepts are proven to work and are therefore adopted universally by the U.S.</p>
<b>Force projection:</b>	
Strategic lift (air-sea-ground)	<p><b>2005</b> Red for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU, provided programs come to fruition</p>
Sea control	<p><b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU                  However complacency in attention to sea control capabilities could make maritime access a critical vulnerability, in particular from underwater threats.</p>
Counter mine operations	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU                  But maritime mine clearance may well be on the critical timeline for insertion of forces.</p>
Tactical lift	<p><b>2005</b> Red for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU                  May have to operate in a hostile environment and require greater levels of protection and secure communications. Ground mobility also important.</p>
Air refueling	Common standards needed.
Reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI)	A potential node of critical vulnerability of conventional and unconventional attack. Civilian offloading assets are particularly vulnerable.
<b>Force protection:</b>	
SEAD	<p><b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Yellow for EU                  A continued requirement notwithstanding UAV's and stand-off offensive systems.</p>
NBC	<p>A continued research and development priority.                  Chemical:  <b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU  <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU                  Provided research and development are continued                  Biological:  <b>2005</b> Red for U.S. / Red for EU  <b>2015</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU                  Provided research and development are continued. Policy for casualty evacuation needs to be harmonized and is particularly sensitive. Problem of differences in protection among coalition partners and host nation civilians.                  Radiological:                  No particular comment</p>

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS

Table C.2: U.S.-led Coalition (Continued)

Capabilities	Medium to High-Level Conflict
Counter-mine operations (breaching)	<b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU But maritime mine clearance may well be on the critical timeline for the insertion of forces.
Air defense	<b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU With sufficient research and development for air defense against unmanned vehicles/cruise missile systems and low observable threats.
Missile defense	<b>2005</b> Red for U.S. / Red for EU <b>2015</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU European forces may be dependent on the U.S. for missile defense.
Combat search and rescue (CSAR)/recovery	<b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Red for EU <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Red for EU Morale aspects of the capability should not be undervalued.
<b>Engagement/Operate:</b>	Capabilities must be related to context (capability and competence of enemy and specific battlespace environment)
Deep battle forces	<b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. (Deeply buried targets) / Red for EU (Shortage of European deep strike capability.) <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. (but yellow for time-critical targets) / Yellow for EU European forces will sooner rather than later be unable to integrate into long range U.S. air strike operations unless great progress is made in C <sup>3</sup> connectivity. Integration in the deep battle may not however be particularly critical.
Close battle forces	<b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. (fighting in built-up areas) / Yellow-Red for EU The critical issue is the extent to which European brigades can integrate into a U.S. operation at the tempo of the U.S. forces. If this tempo is to be achieved, European command integration is inadequate notwithstanding the individual warfighting capabilities of European forces, and this situation will potentially worsen. Level of ongoing operations means that opportunities for NATO corps level exercises will be rare. The use of simulation and wargaming will be critical. <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Yellow for EU Ability to integrate will be dependent on C <sup>3</sup> connectivity as well as on achieving U.S. tempo and harmonization of doctrine.
Special forces	<b>2015</b> Multinational interoperability not a particular problem because of independent nature of their operations. There will be a need to bear in mind deconfliction of operations with concurrent conventional operations.
Rear area	Enables close and deep operations. Three problems: protecting lines of communications and support facilities, guarding of POWs, and vulnerability to asymmetric attack. National responsibilities for sustainment should not be at the expense of rear area coordination and an integrated rear area command. Sufficient redundancy may be an important element of the commander's risk analysis.
Control of electronic battlespace	<b>2005</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU <b>2015</b> Yellow for U.S. / Yellow for EU Becoming more important as the reliance increases on network-centric warfare and information dominance at the expense of firepower. This will always be a vulnerability and will require constant research and development to stay ahead of threats, including unconventional threats.

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT/RESCUE OPERATION

Table C.2: U.S.-led Coalition (Continued)

Capabilities	Medium to High-Level Conflict
<b>Logistics:</b>  Support, sustain	<b>2005</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU <b>2015</b> Green for U.S. / Green for EU Specific logistics will remain national. NATO standards must be maintained for those common aspects of logistics. EU should avoid generating a parallel set of standards. Footprint differences and problems of protection of logistics bases will exist.
<b>Medical:</b>	There are existing national shortfalls, but the coalition can handle them. Medical records Different philosophies (French repatriate, UK in theater) Telemedicine?
<b>Civilian-Military Cooperation:</b>  Inter-agency, NGO	There is a difference in approach to the CIMIC relationship during warfighting and when dealing with complex emergencies. The conduct of combat operations must take priority in warfighting. Civil agencies/NGOs must be coopted into supporting military operations and integrated into planning processes. It is nonetheless important that the CIMIC relationship during warfighting does not prejudice the relationship in the post-war reconstruction/stabilization phase, which will have more in common with complex emergencies. Displaced persons/refugee management is important consideration in the conduct of military operations. The relationship between coalition soldiers and local population is particularly important for building the subsequent peace. This must be part of pre-operation and generic training and should include understanding of international law. Future command and headquarters models have to address the periodic need to interact with non-military agencies NGOs, etc.

Green = No Capability Shortfall / Yellow = Some Capability Shortfall / Red = Severe Capability Shortfall

## HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT/RESCUE OPERATION IN EAST AFRICA (EU-AUTONOMOUS)

The subgroup established for the intervention the two broad political objectives of helping to create a more favorable context for solving the humanitarian crisis and of ensuring the safety of foreign nationals (U.S. and EU) in the area. The military tasks identified to fulfill these objectives included:

- improve intelligence collection in the theater;

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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- pre-position evacuation force afloat off the coast of north state;
- conduct information campaign to ensure clear understanding of forces' purposes and intentions deter or coerce independent armed groups from interfering with humanitarian assistance;
- conduct progressive deployment of the humanitarian support force; and
- plan for optimization of humanitarian and humanitarian support resources (civil and military).

The EU intervention would consist of the following measures:

- a possible evacuation of European and U.S. nationals, if things turn bad in the Western part of North State;
- a security mission, first localized to initial entry points and progressively expanded to the areas where humanitarian support is or has to be provided, and
- an assistance mission in the provision of humanitarian support (transport and delivery).

The forces deployed for the intervention would include one light combat brigade (security and extraction force), one logistics brigade (humanitarian support with military police, transport units and engineers, and air and naval support assets). The sequence of events could be an initial force projection (security/extraction) by air, with forward elements of the logistics echelon also deploying by air with the main body arriving by sea (both civilian and military sea lift).

For command arrangements, two different situations could have to be considered:

- Rescue mission (evacuation of foreign nationals), for which the lead nation concept would apply (including communications); and
- Humanitarian support, which would be more open to adjustments.

## HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT/RESCUE OPERATION

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The EU-led coalition would rely extensively on key states for situation assessment, strategic planning and communications (national satellite with HF back up for strategic communications). Strategic and mobile theater headquarters would be provided by one nation with multinational supporting contributions. Secure strategic communications could be established via national satellite resources.

The subgroup discussed the following issues regarding force projection:

- Significant variations in the level of force could be required for the rescue mission (from one battalion to a brigade with engineering, helicopter and air support).
- Airlift capability would be adequate for the lower-end national evacuation operation, but uncertain otherwise.
- Sea lift would be required for humanitarian support (logistics brigade with transport and engineers).
- Airlift can provide supplementary capability, but sea and ground assets (trucks) will be essential for food distribution in the theater.

The subgroup identified a number of capability issues related to the intervention:

- **For the pre-crisis phase, early intelligence gathering capabilities might be limited.** Due to the humanitarian nature of the operation (and the possible evacuation of U.S. nationals by European forces), it was felt that U.S. satellite or other U.S. intelligence data would be made available to the intervening coalition. Human intelligence would also quickly play a key role in the development of the intervention.
- **Airlift.** The primary limitation discussed by the group is a military airlift capability shortage in 2005 for the projection of early entry elements. This shortage would be essentially corrected by 2015 with the introduction of the A-400M or similar capabilities. Due to the need for sea transport for the logistic brigade heavy elements, the entire force could not be deployed in less than

## **APPENDIX C. DETAILED COALITION INTERVENTIONS**

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a month. The airlift limitation would delay the deployment of the extraction force for a possible evacuation operation. It could also delay the timely control of initial points of entry for the main body of the humanitarian support force. Limitations in airport facilities in the region and the possibility of a non-combatant evacuation operation in a non-totally permissive environment would also increase the requirement for tactical military airlift capability.

- **Sea lift.** Shipping equipment to facilitate the loading and unloading of heavy logistic elements could also be an issue. This equipment is available only in small quantities and conflicts of priorities could arise with other ongoing operations (i.e. logistics support of other peacekeeping deployments).
- **Tactical communications.** Secure, interoperable tactical communications between the different elements of the intervening forces could also be an issue.
- **Psychological operations.** Lack of coherent psychological operations capabilities at the European level could also significantly hamper the deployment of both the security and humanitarian support forces.
- **Command arrangements.** In the absence of permanent multinational command structures for the strategic or theater level, the necessity of a lead nation concept or a concept of lead nations (one lead nation for each level or functional responsibility within the intervention) was emphasized.
- **Logistics.** For the support of the intervening forces, the subgroup noted that current plans call for the deployment of national assets to support national contributions to the multinational force. Due to the extension of the lines of communications between Europe and the Horn of Africa, some consolidation in this domain would look very beneficial to the overall effectiveness of the force.

## **NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>There is no quantitative link between the number of assets available to collect information and the intelligence product that comes out. Human interpretation of information collected is critical.

<sup>2</sup>This might have to be done on an ad hoc basis.

<sup>3</sup>The growing U.S.-European technology gap was discussed. It is very difficult to say what the implications will be for interoperability, but it is an important factor that must be considered.

<sup>4</sup>NATO contribution limited to AWACS.

<sup>5</sup>NATO could provide useful link to partner countries for provision of additional lift.

<sup>6</sup>Throughout this table, EU is shorthand for “The European Union and/or European countries.”



## APPENDIX D

# Coalition Military Operations

Multinational military operations across virtually the entire spectrum of warfare have played an increasingly prominent role in international security policy since the end of the Cold War. The success of a coalition depends in large part upon the ability of its members to work effectively together.

U.S.-CREST, with the participation of FRS, RUSI and SWP, examined how countries can better cooperate to enhance coalition effectiveness.

Although ad hoc processes and traditional coalition organizational approaches have worked to the extent required to enable coalitions to form and to carry out their military missions, coalitions cannot continue to rely exclusively on them.

Project participants concluded that coalition operations need greater interoperability, and most importantly, a new focus on *cooperability*, meaning the successful bridging between coalition partners of differences in doctrine, organization, concepts of operation, and culture. To that end, the study proposed three overarching recommendations:

- Establish a multi-country analysis program on emerging security issues and establish data bases for the related contingencies. This program would operate in confidentiality, using open sources and unclassified information.
- Establish experimental programs to explore new concepts and technologies for the purpose of co-evolving common enhancements to coalition operations for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and regional conflict. A cooperative process among the participating countries would define the goals and individual experiments of the program.

## **APPENDIX D. COALITION MILITARY OPERATIONS**

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- Establish focal points in each nation to serve as the nation's focus for cooperability/interoperability.

This report, entitled *Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability*, was published in April 2000. A full copy in Acrobat (pdf) format may be downloaded from the U.S.-CREST web site at <http://www.uscrest.org/CMO.htm>

## PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to members of the four research institutes and civilian experts, individuals from the following organizations participated in some or all of the meetings:

### FRANCE

- CHEM (Centre des Hautes Études Militaires)
- CDES (Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement militaire Supérieur de l'armée de terre)
- Defense Attaché's Office and Office of Defense Cooperation, French Embassy, Washington, D.C.
- DGA/DSP/SASF (Délégation Générale pour l'Armement/Direction des Systèmes de forces et de la Prospective/Service d'Architecture des Systèmes de Forces)
- État-Major des Armées (Études et Stratégie Militaire Générale, Collège des Officiers de Cohérence Opérationnelle, Emploi)

### GERMANY

- BMVg Fü S III 6 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, Pol-Mil division)
- Defense Attaché's Office, German Embassy, Washington, D.C.
- ZASBw (Zentrum für Analysen und Studien der Bundeswehr)

## **UNITED KINGDOM**

- Defense Attaché's Office and Office of Defense Cooperation, British Embassy, Washington, D.C.
- Directorate of Defence Policy Planning
- Directorate of Force Development

## **UNITED STATES**

- CINCPACFLT (Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy Europe)
- Joint Staff (J-7)
- National Defense University (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies)
- Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Paris
- OSD (Acquisition Technology & Logistics, Policy, Net Assessment)
- U.S. EUCOM (U.S. European Command)
- U.S. Mission to NATO
- CNA (Center for Naval Analyses)
- IDA (Institute for Defense Analyses)

## LIST OF PROJECT PRINCIPALS

**Michael Codner** is Assistant Director (Military Sciences), Royal United Services Institute. As such he conducts research on a variety of issues ranging from defense policy, strategic theory and doctrine, to defense management, future concepts and the application of technology to military capability. He retired from the Royal Navy in October 1995 after a career as a Seaman Officer principally working in anti-submarine warfare, maritime strategy and doctrine, future concepts, defense policy, and international issues. He was a lecturer in strategy and operational art at the U.S. Naval War College, was a Defence Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London and has held a NATO Fellowship working on coalition interoperability.

**Lieutenant General (Ret.) Christian Delanghe** is Director of Studies at U.S.-CREST since his retirement from active service in 2001. His command experience includes the 51<sup>st</sup> Air Defense Regiment in Germany; the 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Division in France; the Multinational Division South East, NATO Stabilization Force, Bosnia; and the French Army Training and Doctrine Command, Paris. His military career also includes several assignments as staff officer in Military intelligence agency, French Joint staff, research centers and schools. He is a graduate of Saint-Cyr, the U.S. Air Defense Advanced Course in Fort Bliss, Senior Command and War College in Paris, Center for Higher Military Studies, and the National Defense Institute in Paris.

**Jean-François Delpéch** is President, U.S.-CREST. Dr. Delpéch graduated from the École Polytechnique (Paris), has a M.Sc in Electrical Engineering (Stanford University), and a Ph.D in Physics (Université de Paris). He is Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Center for Scientific Research), and has worked extensively on issues at the interface of technology and security policy. He has served as chairman of the working group and

senior advisory board of the multinational project on coalition military operations, as well as of other U.S.-CREST multinational working group projects.

**William Hopkinson** is an Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute. He entered the Ministry of Defence in 1986, and was appointed Head of the Defence Arms Control Unit in 1988. He became Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy) in 1993. As such he was particularly concerned with bilateral relationships with members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. He was also responsible for European security institutions, including NATO, WEU, and EU matters, and for oversight of negotiations on arms control treaties. Upon leaving government service in 1997, he became Deputy Director and Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) until June 2000.

**Joseph Eash** is Senior Research Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems and Concepts). Prior to his current position, he was Principal Research Engineer, Georgia Tech Research Institute. He was also responsible for oversight of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations while holding the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems & Concepts), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Mr. Eash served as the OSD Acquisition Technology and Logistics focal point for Joint Experimentation, Transformation, the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, and Science and Technology Transition Initiatives.

**Robert Grant** is Senior Research Associate, U.S.-CREST. Dr. Grant obtained a Ph.D in Political Science from the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris. He was Senior Consultant at ERC International from 1985 to 1990 and consultant to the Institute for Defense Analyses before joining U.S.-CREST in July 1990. He is currently in residence in England, close to London. He has worked and written on a broad range of transatlantic security issues, including defense responses to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, U.S.-European armaments cooperation, coalition military operations, NATO adaptation, and French defense policy. Dr. Grant has served as director for a wide range of U.S.-CREST multinational projects..

**Joseph Luquire** is Senior Advisor, U.S.-CREST. Dr. Luquire graduated from the Citadel with a B.S. in Physics. He received his M.S. and Ph.D in Physics from the University of Tennessee. Dr. Luquire has served in both industry and government at senior executive levels with responsibilities for international technology developments, including at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

**Col. (Ret.) Dominique Orsini** is Deputy Director, U.S.-CREST. He graduated from the Military Academy of Saint-Cyr and from the École de Guerre (Paris), and received a Master's Degree in Operations Research (Université de Paris VI). Col. Orsini served over 25 years in the French Army. His experience in transatlantic security and defense issues ranges from operational planning activities as a staff officer, to political and military exchanges as an attaché in Washington, D.C. He also took part in two international cooperative development programs for future military systems.

**Stanley Sloan** is President of VIC-Vermont. Mr. Sloan began his more than three decades of public service at the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967, serving as NATO and European Community desk officer, member of the U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. He was employed by the Congressional Research Service from 1975–1999, retiring in April of that year from his position as Senior Specialist in International Security Policy. During 1987–1988 Mr. Sloan was Study Director for the North Atlantic Assembly's Committee on "NATO in the 1990s," and from 1997 to 1999 was the advisor to the Senate NATO Observer Group.



# ABOUT THE FOUR INSTITUTES

## U.S.-CREST

The **U.S.-Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology** is a private, non-profit public policy research institute incorporated in 1989. U.S.-CREST's central goal is to promote public understanding of the far-reaching interactions between transatlantic relations, defense, and science and technology.

## FRS

The **Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique** provides assessments of defense and security policies, of security-related technology issues, and of the sociology of conflict. The Fondation's work contributes to public policy decision-making, to the public debate in France on strategic and security issues, and to the diffusion of French thinking.

## RUSI

Founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington and based in the center of Whitehall, London, the **Royal United Services Institute** is the oldest institute of its kind in the world. It is a professional and independent authority dedicated to the study, analysis and debate of issues affecting defense and international security.

## SWP

The **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik** is a foundation that was established in 1962 for the purpose of furthering analytical research into problems of international affairs. Publicly funded, but politically independent, the SWP today constitutes the largest research institute of its kind in the Federal Republic of Germany.

English and French versions of the executive summary, as well as a full copy of the report in Acrobat (pdf) format, may be downloaded from the U.S.-CREST web site at <http://www.uscrest.org/CESDP.htm>

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